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John Quigley*
The United States and the United
Nations in the Persian Gulf War:
New Order or Disorder?
Introduction
The 1991 war waged against Iraq by a U.S.-led coalition of states met
with general approval in the United States. Despite early reservations,
Congress gave its endorsement, and opinion polls showed broad public
support. The collective action, taken in response to Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, was hailed as a harbinger of a new international order that
would find the major powers united against aggression wherever it
might occur. The United Nations Security Council, long handicapped
by the Cold War, was seen as fulfilling its designated role of maintaining
the peace.
The legality of the action was less clear, however. President George
Bush's administration relied on Security Council Resolution 678, which
authorized using "all necessary means" to evict Iraq from Kuwait. The
administration's justification rested on two premises: (1) that its action
was consistent with Resolution 678, and (2) that Resolution 678 was a
lawful exercise of power by the Security Council. Neither premise, how-
ever, was self-evident. Critics charged that the military action against
Iraq did not fall within the scope authorized by Resolution 678 and that
the Security Council violated the U.N. Charter by giving Member States
overly broad authority.
This Article explores the two premises in order to assess the legality
of actions taken by both the United States and the United Nations in the
Persian Gulf War. In that context, the Article also reflects on the proper
role of the U.N. Security Council in responding to breaches of the
peace.
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A. 1966, Harvard Law
School.
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I. Resolution 678
After a period of negotiation over several contentious issues, Iraq
invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Among its contentions, Iraq
asserted a longstanding Iraqi claim to sovereignty over Kuwait on the
ground that Kuwait had been a part of the province of Basra when the
area was under the Ottoman Empire, and Basra wound up as part of
Iraq when the area was divided into states. I Iraq had not, however, con-
sistently maintained this claim and had, at one point, recognized
Kuwait's independence.2 Even though the Iraqi government asserted
that Kuwait was part of Iraq, Kuwait enjoyed sovereignty under accepted
international principles, making Iraq's attack an act of aggression. 3
In response to the Iraqi attack, President Bush sent a military force
to Saudi Arabia, saying that the reason was to prevent an Iraqi invasion
of Saudi Arabia.4 At the same time, he took the issue to the U.N. Secur-
ity Council, which adopted a series of resolutions directed against Iraq.
In Resolution 660, the Council condemned Iraq for aggression. 5 It also
imposed a trade and financial embargo to force Iraq to withdraw from
Kuwait. 6 It declared Iraq's attempted annexation of Kuwait null and
void 7 and demanded that Iraq allow the departure of foreign nationals
whom it had forbidden to leave Iraq.8 The Council supported its
embargo by calling on U.N. Member States to take naval action blocking
Iraqi exports and imports9 and to deny take-off rights to aircraft carry-
ing goods other than medicine or certain foodstuffs to Iraq.10
In November 1990, President Bush doubled the U.S. force in Saudi
Arabia, stating that he wanted the capability to drive Iraq out of
1. IRAQ, DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION, KUWAIT AND ITS HISTORICAL AND LEGAL
RELATIONS wrrH IRAQ (1990), reprinted in 13 Hous. J. INT'L L. 282 (1991). On the
specific disputes between Iraq and Kuwait, see infra notes 36-40 and accompanying
text.
2. See Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq
Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters,
Oct. 4, 1963, 485 U.N.T.S. 326 (stating, "[t]he Republic of Iraq recognized the inde-
pendence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait . . ."); Majid Khadduri,
Iraq's Claim to the Sovereignty of Kuwayt, 23 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 5, 30 (1990).
3. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
4. Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Sends U.S. Force to Saudi Arabia as Kingdom Agrees to
Confront Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al.
5. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2923rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660
(1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325 (1990).
6. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661
(1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325 (1990).
7. S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/662
(1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1327 (1990).
8. S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/664
(1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1328 (1990).
9. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/665
(1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1329 (1990).
10. S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2943rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/670
(1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1334 (1990).
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Kuwait."' He approached the Security Council for a resolution sanc-
tioning military force against Iraq, and the Council adopted Resolution
678, which read:
The Security Council,
Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990,
661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August, 664 (1990) of 18
August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September
1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September
1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990
and 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990,
Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to
comply with its obligation to implement resolution 660 (1990) and the
above-mentioned subsequent resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the
Security Council,
Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the
United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international
peace and security,
Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all
subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining
all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of
goodwill, to do so;
2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of
Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991, fully imple-
ments, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolu-
tions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement
resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to
restore international peace and security in the area;
3. Requests all states to provide appropriate support for the actions
undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;
4. Requests the states concerned to keep the Security Council regu-
larly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present resolution;
5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.1 2
Resolution 678 was adopted by twelve votes (Canada, Colombia,
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Romania, USSR, U.K.,
U.S., Zaire) to two (Cuba, Yemen), with one abstention (China). 13 The
resolution did not expressly mention military force, but used instead the
phrase "all necessary means." Nevertheless, in statements made during
the debate, Security Council representatives indicated that they under-
11. Michael R. Gordon, Bush Sends New Units to Gulf to Provide "Offensive Option"
U.S. Force Could Reach 380,000, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1990, at Al. See also BoB WOOD-
WARD, THE COMMANDERS 297-321 (1991) (on the policy debate leading to this
decision).
12. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1565 (1990).
13. Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg., at 64-65,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.2963 (1990) [hereinafter Provisional Verbatim Record].
Cornell International Law Journal
stood that "necessary" could include military. 14
On January 8, 1991, President Bush sent Congress a letter seeking
support for military action against Iraq. He wrote, "I therefore request
that the House of Representatives and the Senate adopt a Resolution
stating that Congress supports the use of all necessary means to imple-
ment UN Security Council Resolution 678."'1 Complying with Bush's
request, Congress enacted a joint resolution, stating that "[t]he Presi-
dent is authorized ... to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to
United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to
achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662,
664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677."16
On January 16, 1991, President Bush initiated military action
against Iraq by air and informed U.N. Secretary-GeneralJavier P6rez de
Cuellar that the United States intended to implement Resolution 678.17
Explaining the action to the public, he said it was "taken in accord with
United Nations resolutions." 1 8 Thus, President Bush rested the legality
of the action on Resolution '678.
14. "A Pause of Goodwill" - Security Council Enacts 48-day Waiting Period for Iraqi Com-
pliance with Resolutions, U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Mar. 1991, at 46 [hereinafter A Pause of
Goodwill]; Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 32 (statement of Mr. AI-Ashtal,
Yemen, referring to Res. 678 as "in effect authorizing States to use force" and calling
it a "war resolution"); id. at 58 (statement of Mr. Malmierca Peoli, Cuba, calling the
resolution "a virtual declaration of war" and a "deadline for war"); id. at 62 (state-
ment of Mr. Ojan Qchen, China, that "all necessary means" is language that "in
essence, permits the use of military action"); id. at 67 (statement of Mr. Dumas,
France, that Iraq used force and that Council must "resort to this same means"); id.
at 71 (statement of Mr. Clark, Canada, that the "means" in Res. 678 "include the use
of force"); id. at 74 (statement of Mr. Abu Hassan, Malaysia, referring to the "force
authorized by the Council"); id. at 81-82 (statement of Mr. Hurd, U.K., that, accord-
ing to the resolution, Member States "are authorized to use such force as may be
necessary to compel compliance"; also referring to the resolution as "the military
option"); id. at 103 (statement of Mr. Baker, U.S., that "[t]oday's resolution is very
clear. The words authorize the use of force.").
15. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 27 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 17, 18 (Jan. 14, 1991) (identical letters to speaker of House of Represent-
atives, Senate majority leader, Senate minority leader, and House minority leader).
16. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No.
102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 (West Supp. 1991)).
17. Evelyn Leopold, U.N. Chief Expresses Sorrow at Start of War, Talked to Bush,
REUTERs AM CYCLE, Jan. 16, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File) (quoting a U.N.
spokesperson saying, "[t]he secretary-general was informed about 6 p.m. EST by
President Bush that the coalition intended to implement Resolution 678."). See also
Hostilities Begin in Gulf Area: Secretary-General Expresses "Deep Sorrow", U.N. MONTHLY
CHRON., Mar. 1991, at 47.
18. Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf,
27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 50 (Jan. 21, 1991); reprinted in Transcript of the Comments
by Bush on the Air Strikes Against the Iraqis, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 17, 1991, at A14. See also
Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Persian Gulf Conflict, 27 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 59 (Jan. 21, 1991) ("The operations of U.S.... forces are contemplated
by the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council.").
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II. United States Compliance with Resolution 678
The Bush administration's reliance on Resolution 678 raises two issues.
The first is whether the administration resorted to military force more
quickly, or in greater measure, than contemplated by the resolution.
The second is whether resolution 678 was valid under the U.N. Charter.
This Section addresses the first issue.
A. The Need for Combat
Resolution 678 authorized only the means "necessary" to gain Iraq's
compliance with the Security Council's prior resolutions. In the Council
debate, U.K. Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd said that under the resolu-
tion Member States, "are authorized to use such force as may be neces-
sary to compel compliance." 1 9 This limitation was consistent with
international law strictures against the use of force. Article 33 of the
U.N. Charter requires states to settle their differences by peaceful
means. Force is permitted only as a grave exception to normal means of
interaction (1) in self-defense, 20 (2) through Security Council action,2 1
or (3) through the action of a regional security organization. 22 In these
three situations, the force is permissible only if necessary to thwart the
aggressive acts against which it is directed.
The limitation of means in Resolution 678 to those "necessary"
meant that if the Security Council's trade sanctions held a reasonable
prospect of gaining Iraq's compliance, military force was not authorized.
Similarly, if negotiation of outstanding issues, coupled with the pressure
of the trade sanctions, could gain Iraq's compliance, then that avenue
would have to be pursued prior to the use of force. Although Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter envisages the use of military force to stop and
reverse aggression, "the goal of Chapter VII is action short of force, if
possible."' 23 By adding Resolution 678 to the arsenal of sanctions
already unleashed on Iraq, the Security Council hoped to get Iraq out of
Kuwait through negotiation.
A number of Security Council members, even as they voted for Res-
olution 678, stressed the need for diplomatic efforts prior to the January
15, 1991, deadline established by the resolution, in order to avoid war.
The United States was among them. Explaining the U.S. vote in favor of
Resolution 678, Secretary of State James Baker said, "We continue to
seek a diplomatic solution."'2 4 The USSR expressed "the confidence
that we will be able to overcome this crisis peacefully-I repeat, peace-
fully, and in a political way. .... "25 Malaysia, referring approvingly to
19. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 82 (statement of Mr. Hurd, U.K.).
20. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
21. Id. arts. 39-50.
22. Id. arts. 52-54.
23. Brian Urquhart, Learningfrom the Gulf, N.Y. REviEw OF Booxs, Mar. 7, 1991, at
34.
24. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 103 (statement of Mr. Baker, U.S.).
25. Id. at 96 (statement of Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR).
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 25
Colombia's ongoing efforts to promote negotiations between Iraq and
Kuwait, viewed such efforts as "a logical complement to resolution
678," and said that many U.N. Member States "would like the Security
Council seriously to consider such an initiative."' 26 Finland urged that
the coming weeks "be fully utilized in order to achieve a peaceful way
out of the crisis," and stated its hope that Secretary-General P6rez de
Cuellar would arrange a settlement.2 7
Other Council members called on the Secretary-General to inter-
cede. Colombia asked him to use his "good offices with a view to pro-
moting a peaceful settlement of the conflict."'2 8 Romania said,
[w]e continue to believe that every effort should be made to ease the
existing tension politically and to solve the issues at stake by peaceful
means .... We are thinking in particular of the capabilities of the Secur-
ity Council and of the good offices and other initiatives that may be
undertaken by the Secretary-General. 29
Secretary-General Prez de Cuellar, speaking in the Security Coun-
cil after the vote, said that Resolution 678 "envisages at least 45 days of
earnest effort to achieve a peaceful solution of the crisis." ' 0 He said,
"the situation requires that diplomatic efforts be made with renewed
determination to put the present crisis on the road to a peaceful out-
come." ' Thus, the Security Council understood resolution 678 to
authorize military force only after other means were exhausted.
Like the Security Council, the U.S. Congress understood Resolu-
tion 678 to mandate diplomacy before force. In authorizing action
under the joint resolution, it required that the President, before using
military force, determine that "the United States has used all appropri-
ate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq
with the United Nations Security Council resolutions."'3 2
Immediately after the adoption of Resolution 678, President Bush
announced that he would invite Iraq's foreign minister to Washington
and send Secretary of StateJames Baker to Baghdad. He said his admin-
istration would "discuss all aspects of the Gulf crisis" but added that the
discussions would proceed only "within the mandate of the United
Nations resolutions."'3 3 This caveat suggested that the issues Iraq
wanted to raise were beyond the scope of the contemplated talks.
26. Id. at 78 (statement of Mr. Abu Hassan, Malaysia). See also id. at 52 (statement
of Mr. Malmierca Peoli, Cuba, that Malaysia, Yemen, Colombia, and Cuba had been
working on ways to promote a peaceful settlement).
27. Id. at 84-85 (statement of Mr. Passio, Finland).
28. Id. at 42 (statement of Mr. Jaramillo, Colombia).
29. Id. at 97 (statement of Mr. Nastase, Romania).
30. Id. at 106 (statement of Mr. Prez de Cuellar, Secretary-General).
31. Id.
32. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No.
102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 (West Supp. 1991)).
33. Excerpts from President's News Conference on Crisis in Gulf, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 1,
1990, at A6.
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In the weeks that followed, the administration narrowly construed
its commitment to talk to Iraq. Secretary Baker explained that Iraq had
a "choice," namely to decide whether to leave Kuwait. "To ensure that
[Iraqi President] Saddam [Hussein] understands this choice," he said,
"the President has invited the Foreign Minister of Iraq to Washington
and has directed me to go to Baghdad.... [M]y mission to Baghdad will
be an attempt to explain to Saddam the choice he faces: comply with the
objectives of the Security Council or risk disaster for Iraq. . .. 34 This
will not be a negotiation." 35 Thus, the administration did not contem-
plate any give-and-take with Iraq.
The resolution of existing issues, however, might have defused the
crisis. Iraq had raised a number of complaints against Kuwait in the
weeks preceding its invasion of Kuwait.3 6 Iraq claimed that Kuwait had
extracted oil from a pool beneath the Iraq-Kuwait border that belonged
to Iraq. Moreover, the border around the oilfield was disputed, and
Kuwait had recently set up oil rigs farther north, a move that Iraq con-
sidered provocative.3 7 Iraq also sought better access to the waters of
the Persian Gulf. As a result of the borders drawn by a British official in
the 1920s to separate Iraq and Kuwait, only a narrow stretch of Iraq
touched the Gulf.3 8
Oil pricing was another contentious matter. During the Iraq-Iran
war, due to Iraq's reduced ability to export, Kuwait and other Gulf states
had profited by picking up oil sales that had been Iraq's. In 1989-90,
Kuwait, instead of cutting production to let Iraq recoup, pumped more
oil than its agreed OPEC quota, driving world prices down. This led
Iraq to charge Kuwait with economic aggression. Iraq suspected that
Kuwait sought to gain concessions on the territorial issues by driving
down oil prices. During the spring of 1990, an Iraqi government report
34. U.S. Policy in the Persian Guf. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 107, (pt. 1 1990) (statement of Secretary Baker) [hereinafter
U.S. Policy in the Persian Guly].
35. Id. at 116. See also id. at 140 (Secretary Baker characterized any negotiation
with Iraq as "walking back from the U.N. Security Council resolutions."). See also
WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 336-37 (suggesting that the administration offered to
talk to Iraq to convince the U.S. public that it was trying to avoid war, but that it was
not seriously working towards a peaceful solution).
36. Liesl Graz, Iraqi Sabres Rattle in the Gulf, MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, Aug. 3,
1990, at 3. Joe Stork & Ann M. Lesch, Why War?, MIDDLE EAST REPORT, Nov.-Dec.
1990, at 11.
37. See G. Henry M. Schuler, Congress Must Take a Hard Look at Iraq's Charges against
Kuwait, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1990, at M4. Thomas C. Hayes, Big Oilfield Is at the Heart of
Iraq-Kuwait Dispute, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 3, 1990, at A7. See also U.S. Policy in the Persian
Gulf, supra note 34, at 149 (When Senator Frank Murkowski suggested giving Iraq an
assurance that the oilfield issue would be discussed if it withdrew from Kuwait, Secre-
tary Baker rejected the idea, saying, "we do not lend credence to the suggestion that
somehow an aggressor can be rewarded for his aggression. We are talking about a
New World Order that would operate on a different principle entirely.").
38. See Shaw J. Dallal, Has the United States Overreacted?, MIDDLE EAST INTERNA-
TIONAL, Oct. 12, 1990, at 20; Khadduri, supra note 2, at 26-28. Iraq also claimed two
offshore islands, which would give it additional access to Gulf waters and allow it to
better protect its short shoreline and port facilities. Id. at 33.
Cornell International Law Journal
alleged Kuwait refused to make concessions on these issues, telling King
Hussein ofJordan at the time that it had assurances of U.S. intervention
in case of trouble with Iraq.3 9 Several political figures proposed binding
arbitration, or some similar process, to resolve these differences
between Iraq and Kuwait.40
Iraq expressed interest in negotiating a solution to these differences
during the fall of 1990, but the Bush administration showed no interest
in establishing a mechanism to resolve these issues. 4 1 Following the
adoption of Resolution 678, Iraq continued to send signals that it was
willing to begin a dialogue that might lead to its withdrawal from
Kuwait. On December 6, 1990, Iraq met one of the Security Council's
demands when it announced that it would permit the departure from
Iraq of all foreign nationals. 4 2 In early January, Iraq offered to leave
Kuwait if the U.S. did not attack during the withdrawal, if foreign troops
left the region, if an agreement were reached to hold a Palestinian-
Israeli conference, and if weapons of mass destruction were banned
from the region. The Bush administration did not follow up on this
proposal.43
The Bush administration made no effort to seek a negotiated settle-
ment leading to Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, 44 despite requests from
39. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Iraq Seeks Bigger Role in OPEC, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
1990, at D1; Youssef M. Ibrahim, Iraq Said to Prevail in Oil Dispute with Kuwait and Arab
Emirates, N.Y. TIMES,July 26, 1990, at Al; Schuler, supra note 37, at M4 (Iraq released
what it said was a captured Kuwaiti report on U.S.-Kuwaiti meetings in which the two
agreed that Kuwait should pressure Iraq on the oil pricing issue to get a good border
settlement.). See also Milton Viorst, The House of Hashem, NEW YORKER, Jan. 7, 1991, at
32, 43-44 (reporting Iraqi release of the report on U.S.-Kuwaiti meetings, and indi-
cating that C.I.A. denied validity of the report).
40. See John F. Burns, Iraqis Threaten to Attack Saudis and Israelis if Nation is "Stran-
gled" by Embargo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1990, at Al (efforts at a settlement by King
Hussein ofJordan); U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, supra note 34, at 164, 176 (sugges-
tion by Zbigniew Brzezinski of binding arbitration between Iraq and Kuwait on terri-
torial and financial issues, or submission of these issues to International Court of
Justice). When Senator Paul Simon suggested that the administration promote an
agreement between Iraq and Kuwait to submit their territorial dispute to the Interna-
tional Court ofJustice as part of a plan whereby Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait,
Secretary Baker rejected this approach. Id. at 152-53.
41. Eric Schmitt, U.S. Views Threat by Iraq as Strategy to Split Critics, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 1990, at A 12 (Bush reiterated the administration's position against negotia-
tions with Iraq until it complied with Security Council resolutions and withdrew
forces from Kuwait.).
42. Saddam Hussein Announced Hostage Release, Dec. 6, 1990, FOREIGN POLICY BULLE-
TIN, Jan.-Apr. 1991, at 19.
43. Knut Royce, Iraq Offers Deal to Quit Kuwait; U.S. Reects It, but Stays "Interested,"
NEWSDAY, Jan. 3, 1991, at 5.
44. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in a resolution adopted Jan. 12, called on
"all parties" to "continue efforts towards a political resolution of the crisis" and "not
to allow a military confrontation, which would have catastrophic consequences for
the Middle East and the entire world." In a statement designed to keep the USSR
from becoming involved militarily, the Supreme Soviet "underscore[d] that decisions
requiring, under the USSR Constitution, the approval of the highest legislative
authority may be taken only with the concurrence of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR." VEDOMOSTI S'EZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA
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other states. 4 5 Before attacking, the administration met only once with
Iraq, and in that meeting refused to discuss the issues Iraq deemed rele-
vant.46 Yet when the administration launched massive air strikes against
Iraq on January 16, 1991, President Bush said the attack followed
"months of constant and virtually endless diplomatic activity."' 47 In
response to Congress's requirement that he exhaust diplomatic means,
President Bush informed Congress that diplomatic and other peaceful
means would not compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. 48 However, he
had not attempted serious diplomacy to resolve the situation.
The embargo, moreover, was the most extensive in the history of
the Security Council. Most states were honoring the sanctions against
Iraq. Cuba, objecting to Resolution 678, said that the embargo meant
that "Iraq cannot receive by air, land or sea goods which, in addition to
food and medicine, are essential to the life of a nation. It is obvious that
no State could long withstand the political and economic isolation
imposed on that country." '4 9
Iraq was an ideal target for a trade embargo. Since its national
income depended on oil exports, and since it did not have a fully indus-
trialized economy, it relied heavily on imports.50 At the time of the inva-
SSSR [Gazette of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR], no. 3, item 61 (1991). See Burns Weston, Security Council Resolu-
tion 678 and Persian Gulf Decision-Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM.J. INT'L L. 516,
530 (1991) (criticizing Bush for viewing Resolution 678 as "an unconditional warrant
to go to war come January 15" rather than "a license to use force only as a last
resort"). See also WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 345 (quoting national security advisor
Brent Scowcroft saying that the diplomatic efforts with Iraq during December were
"all exercises," and that Bush had made up his mind to attack Iraq afterJanuary 15).
45. Alan Riding, Europeans Are Struggling to Keep Their Diplomatic Initiative Alive, N.Y.
TiMES,Jan. 11, 1991, at A10 (efforts of European Community at peaceful solution). V
sviazi s obstanovkoi v Persidskom zalive [In Connection with the Situation in the Persian
Gulf], VEDOMOSTI S'EZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR
[Gazette of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR], no. 1, item 19 (1991) (resolution of the Congress of People's
Deputies of the USSR calling for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and a "peaceful
solution of the crisis").
46. See Excerpts from Bush's Remarks on Baker's Mission and Diplomacy's Fate, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at A16; There Is a Chance - or There Was a Chance, GUARDIAN
(London),Jan. 10, 1991, at 2 (Baker: "The message I conveyed ... is that Iraq must
either comply with the will of the international community or be expelled by force
from Kuwait.").
47. Transcript of the Comments by Bush on the Air Strikes Against the Iraqis, N.Y. TMES,
Jan. 17, 1991, at A6.
48. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Persian Gulf Conflict, 27 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 59, (Jan. 21, 1991) (referring to a determination ofJan. 16, 1991,
stating, "I concluded... that only the use of armed force would achieve an Iraqi
withdrawal.").
49. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 58-60 (statement of Mr. Malmierca
Peoli, Cuba).
50. See id. at 34-35 (statement of Mr. AI-Ashtal, Yemen). See also U.S. Policy in the
Persian Gulf, supra note 34, at 121 (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden: "The world
embargo against Kuwait is the most comprehensive in history."). Id. at 124 (state-
ment of Secretary Baker: "We have 4 months of the best sanctions enforcement that
has ever probably existed.").
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sion, many observers thought that the sanctions were already taking a
toll on Iraq.5 1 Economic sanctions, as analysts noted, require time
before they hurt the target state, and thus the full impact on Iraq had yet
to be experienced. 5 2 Several former U.S. military leaders pressed Presi-
dent Bush to give the sanctions more time to take effect. 53 President
Bush did not have a strong basis for concluding that economic sanctions
had failed.
B. Palestinian-Israeli Peace as an Issue
The Bush administration assiduously avoided one major diplomatic
issue which, if resolved, might have led Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.
Iraq argued that its occupation of Kuwait should be dealt with along
with other foreign occupations in the region, including Syria's occupa-
tion of Lebanon and Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon, the Golan
Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank of the Jordan River. 54 But
when President Bush, following Resolution 678, announced he would
talk with the Iraqi government, he refused to participate in an interna-
tional conference on the Israeli occupations.5 5 Secretary Baker explic-
itly indicated what the administration would and would not discuss with
Iraq: "Nor is this the beginning of a negotiation on subjects unrelated
to Iraq's brutal occupation of Kuwait. I will not be negotiating the Pal-
estinian question or the civil war in Lebanon."'5 6
Strong sentiment in the U.N., however, favored dealing with the
Palestinian-Israeli question. The General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion on December 6, 1990, asking the Security Council "to convene the
International Peace Conference on the Middle East."'5 7 The Security
Council discussed the issue, and most members wanted to set a date for
a conference. The Bush administration, however, said the two issues
51. See Gary C. Hufbauer & Kimberly A. Elliott, Sanctions Will Bite - And Soon, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 1991, at A17; U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, supra note 34, at 5 (state-
ment of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara); id. at 61 (statement of Prof.
Gary C. Hufbauer); id. at 170 (statement of former National Security Advisor
Zbigniew Brzezinski); id. at 195 (statement of former Sen. George McGovern).
52. Hufbauer & Elliot, supra note 51, at A17; U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, supra
note 34, at 165 (statement of former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski).
53. See Excerpts from Testimony on the Persian Gulf Crisis before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, Jan. 1991, at 61 (statements of Gen.
DavidJones, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; of Adm. William Crowe, former
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; of James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense
and Energy, former C.I.A. Director). See also WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 36-39,
333-34 (for background on Adm. Crowe's views). Chief of Staff Gen. Colin Powell
reportedly shared this view. Id. at 38-42.
54. Michael R. Gordon, Bush Orders Navy to Halt All Shipments of Iraq's Oil and Almost
All Its Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1990, at Al.
55. Excerpts from President's News Conference on Crisis in Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
1990, at A6.
56. U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, supra note 34, at 107 (statement of Secretary
Baker).
57. G.A. Res. 45/68, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/68, reprinted in
30 I.L.M. 565 (1991).
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could not be linked and threatened to veto any resolution that set a date
for a conference. As a result, when it passed a resolution on the Pales-
tinian-Israeli issue, the Council did not call for an international confer-
ence.58 Had this effort succeeded, a negotiated Iraqi withdrawal from
Kuwait might have been achieved.
The Bush administration argued that to link Iraqi withdrawal with
resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli issue would reward Iraq for its inva-
sion, that Iraq did not invade Kuwait to gain a settlement for the Pales-
tinians, and that Israel's occupation of Arab territories was not the result
of aggression. Other Council members agreed that Iraq did not invade
Kuwait to get Israel to withdraw from Arab territories, but they found
the point irrelevant. For them the Palestinian-Israeli question needed to
be resolved in any event, and they thought that moving towards a settle-
ment might get Iraq to leave Kuwait. To them, it was good diplomacy-
doing something that needed to be done anyway as a means of avoiding
a war.
Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze reflected this view
when he said that the Security Council had long sought a settlement of
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. He asked,
Why should we stop all this now? Are we in some strange way intimi-
dated by the word "linkage?"' 5 9 We believe that we should continue what
we have been doing and what we ought to be doing now: seeking a path
towards a comprehensive settlement of the whole complex of Middle East
problems that existed prior to 2 August. That is not rewarding anyone; it
is just sound policy and common sense.6 0
Many Council members were not persuaded that Israel's occupation
of foreign territory differed from Iraq's. The Council and General
Assembly had repeatedly called on Israel to withdraw from the Arab ter-
ritories.61 The Bush administration's view that Israel acted defensively
in occupying the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in the 1967 war was
considered irrelevant by most other states, because even a state that
takes territory defensively does not acquire sovereign rights.6 2 More-
over, although neither the Council nor the Assembly ever made a find-
58. S.C. Res. 681, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/681 (1990), reprinted
in Text of Resolution on the Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1990, at A4.
59. "Linkage" was the term the Bush administration used with respect to the con-
nection between Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and Israel's occupation of Arab
territories.
60. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 93 (statement of Mr.
Shevardnadze, USSR).
61. See S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1382d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/
Rev.2 (1968); S.C. Res. 476, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., 2242d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/
36 (1980); G.A. Res. 3414, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Supp. No. 34 at 6, U.N. Doc. A/
10034 (1975).
62. See R. Y. JENNINGS, THE AcQuIsITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
55-56 (1963); W. THOMAS MALLISON & SALLY V. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 259 (1986).
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ing on the issue, the evidence pointed to aggression by Israel in 1967.63
The Bush administration's rejection of negotiations on the differ-
ences between Iraq and Kuwait and its refusal to consent to a Palestin-
ian-Israeli conference enabled the administration to avoid all issues that
held any promise of achieving a negotiated Iraqi withdrawal from
Kuwait. Since Resolution 678 contemplated such efforts as a precondi-
tion for any military action against Iraq, the administration's attack on
Iraq, without any attempt at diplomacy, violated the authorization given
by the resolution.
C. The Need for the Ground War against Iraq
Even if the initiation of hostilities was found to conform to Resolution
678, the Bush administration's subsequent military action still had to be
"necessary" to gain Iraq's compliance. If not, it was unauthorized by
Resolution 678.
The course of hostilities, however, suggested that the Bush adminis-
tration was not limiting itself to "necessary" force. On February 22, it
demanded that Iraq leave Kuwait within one week.64 Iraq requested a
ceasefire first, so that it could withdraw in the assurance that its forces
would not be attacked while in a vulnerable position, but Iraq said it
would begin withdrawing the day after a ceasefire, and would complete
the withdrawal within twenty-one days.6 5 A three-week withdrawal
would also give Iraq time to take its weaponry. The administration said
it could not wait, however, because Iraq was following a "scorched-
earth" policy in Kuwait and was killing Kuwaiti civilians.6 6 The adminis-
tration refused to cease fire and gave Iraq an ultimatum to begin with-
drawal from Kuwait the next day and to complete it within seven days.6 7
Iraq did not comply, and on February 23, 1991, the Bush adminis-
tration began a ground assault into southern Iraq, and an air and
ground assault against Iraq's forces in Kuwait. President Bush said that
the objective was "to eject the Iraqi Army from Kuwait." 68 The admin-
istration's rejection of a three-week withdrawal suggested, however, that
Iraqi withdrawal was not its only objective. Even if Iraq was causing
damage in Kuwait, a ground offensive by allied forces would do so as
well.6 9
63. JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE 161-67
(1990).
64. Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Demands Iraq Start Pullout Today Despite Its Assent to 3-
Week Soviet Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1991, at A6.
65. Id.
66. Declarations by President and His Aide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1991, at A19 ("Iraq
continues its scorched-earth policy in Kuwait.").
67. Andrew Rosenthal, Ground War Vowed: Iraqis Say Ultimatum Is Shameful, but
Show Signs of Wavering, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1991, at Al.
68. Announcement by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1991, at A13.
69. See Eric Hooglund, The Other Face of War, MIDDLE EAST REPORT, July-Aug.
1991, at 3, 4 (reporting twenty-eight civilian deaths in Kuwait from allied bombing).
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As the ground war began, the Soviet foreign ministry expressed
"regret that a most real chance for a peaceful outcome to the conflict
and for the attainment of the aims stipulated in the U.N. Security Coun-
cil resolutions, without further human casualties and material destruc-
tion, has been missed."' 70 This was a clear, if polite, criticism of the
administration for starting the ground war needlessly, in violation of the
necessity criterion of Resolution 678. Since Iraq had already agreed to
withdraw, and there was a reasonable prospect it would withdraw, fur-
ther force was not a "necessary means" for getting Iraq out of Kuwait.
In starting the ground war, the Bush administration apparently held
objectives other than getting Iraq out of Kuwait, and hence beyond the
scope of Resolution 678. In the midst of the ground war, National
Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft explained that the administration
hoped to damage the Iraqi forces sufficiently that Iraq would be left with
"no offensive capability."'7 1 General Thomas Kelly, director of opera-
tions for theJoint Chiefs of Staff, said that President Bush had asked the
Joint Chiefs early on both to get the Iraqis out of Kuwait and to "destroy
their ability to conduct offensive operations" outside Iraq. 72 A New York
Times writer noted that, while the U.N. only authorized driving Iraq out
of Kuwait, the United States and its allies fought on "despite a series of
frantic peace bids until they were confident that they had shattered Mr.
Hussein's best divisions." 7 3
In a Senate hearing in December 1990, Secretary Baker indicated
that destroying a large part of Iraq's army might be a war objective. He
said that even if Iraq were ejected from Kuwait "we will still have to
address this problem that is presented by the disproportionate military
power of this country." 74 The problem of the size of Iraq's military, he
said,
does not happen to be standing alone, a specific subject of the U.N.
Security Council resolution. So, when you talk about full implementation
of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions, the case can be made I think
that you could have full implementation without addressing that continu-
ing problem. But I am not sure you could and see yourself obtaining the
four goals the President articulated. 75
Thus, the administration had an aim distinct from Iraqi withdrawal from
Kuwait, namely a diminution of Iraq's future military capacity, and Sec-
retary Baker acknowledged that this aim fell outside the "full implemen-
tation" of Resolution 678.
Speculation swirled around another possible U.S. objective, that of
killing the top Iraqi leadership. The U.S. Air Force's bombing during
70. Countdown to Iraq's Defeat, MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, Mar. 8, 1991, at 7.
71. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 24, 1991).
72. Sunday Today (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 31, 1991).
73. R. W. Apple, Jr., Another Gulf War?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1991, at A16.
74. U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, supra note 34, at 127 (statement of Secretary
Baker).
75. Id. at 138 (statement of Secretary Baker).
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the air war of a bomb shelter in Baghdad that housed high Iraqi officials
and their families suggested that the administration might be targeting
President Saddam Hussein, and that one of its objectives might be to
remove him from office. 76 Secretary Baker argued that removing Presi-
dent Hussein might fall within the authorization of Resolution 678,
since a different Iraqi leadership might withdraw from Kuwait. 7 7 The
Council, however, never discussed a forced change of power in Iraq, and
nothing in its resolutions suggested this approach. Thus, if the adminis-
tration sought to bring down the Iraqi government by killing Iraq's top
officials, this aim was outside Resolution 678.
D. The Need for Combat During Iraq's Withdrawal from Kuwait
On February 26, under the pressure of the ground war, Iraqi forces
began to withdraw from Kuwait. Iraq asked that it be allowed to pull out
without being attacked; in the Security Council, the USSR supported
this request, 78 but the Bush administration refused. President Bush said
of the Iraqi withdrawal, "This changes nothing. The allied assault will
continue with undiminished intensity. ' '7 9 Even as Iraqi troops left
Kuwait, the administration continued the ground war.
At this juncture, President Bush raised a number of collateral issues
as preconditions for stopping his attack on Iraqi forces. He said that
Iraq must comply not only with the Security Council resolution calling
on it to leave Kuwait but with the other eleven Security Council resolu-
tions regarding the situation.8 0 Although the other resolutions were
mentioned in Resolution 678, they were aimed at ending Iraq's occupa-
tion of Kuwait. Iraq had already complied with one resolution that
demanded that Iraq allow foreign nationals to leave Iraq.8 t Another
held Iraq responsible for financial loss resulting from the invasion, but
76. Alessandra Stanley, Iraq Says U.S. Killed Hundreds of Civilians at Shelter, but Allies
Call It a Military Post, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1991, at Al, col. 6 (U.S. officials said the
Amiriya shelter was a command post; reporters who visited could not find evidence
of such use). Robert Fisk, Air Officers in Dispute over Baghdad Raids, INDEPENDENT
(London), Feb. 15, 1991, at 1 (quoting unnamed "senior US military source" saying
that among top U.S. military officials, "there's not a soul who believes that it was a
command and control bunker," but rather that they "thought it was a military per-
sonnel bunker"). See also Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 10, 1992) (LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Currnt File) (Ted Koppel stating "From the very first night of the air
war .... every command bunker in Baghdad was targeted, with the expectation that
Saddam Hussein would be operating out of one of them."); and The Last-Gasp Effort to
Get Saddam, U.S. NEws & WORLD RrT.,Jan. 20, 1992, at 42 (stating that U.S. Air Force
bombed hardened bunker at al-Taji air base Feb. 27, 1991, with bunker-penetrating
bombs because it thought Pres. Hussein was there).
77. Interview, This Week (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 24, 1991).
78. Rosenthal, supra note 64, at A6.
79. Countdown to Iraq's Defeat, MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, Mar. 8, 1991, at 7.
80. Patrick E. Tyler, Administration Says Hussein Must Declare Pullout Himself, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1991, at Al.
81. S.C. Res. 664, supra note 8.
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that was not an issue that could be resolved quickly.82 The administra-
tion apparently raised Iraq's compliance with the other resolutions to
give it time to destroy more of Iraq's military capacity.
As Iraqi troops fled north on the highway leading out of Kuwait, the
U.S. forces bombed and fired on them in what was described by eyewit-
nesses as a "turkey shoot."' 83 The Iraqi forces did not return the U.S.
fire. As a result of this bombing, a massive convoy of Iraqi vehicles was
left in ruins and thousands of fleeing Iraqis died. U.S. commanders jus-
tified the slaughter on the grounds that the Iraqi forces were taking their
equipment and arms with them and were therefore not hors de combat.84
The Iraqi forces were, however, leaving the scene of battle as fast as they
could, apparently simply trying to save themselves. 8 5 A senior Air Force
analyst called the bombing "an outrage" because the fleeing Iraqis
"were whipped. ' 8 6 If the U.S. purpose was to get Iraqi forces out of
Kuwait, there was no need to bomb.
Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Merrill McPeak explained why his
planes bombed the Iraqis: "When enemy armies are defeated, they
retreat, often in disorder, and we have what is known in the business as
the exploitation phase." 87 Gen. McPeak said, "It's during this phase
that the true fruits of victory are achieved from combat."8 8 If the bomb-
ing of the fleeing Iraqis was aimed at reaping the rewards of victory, it
exceeded the authorization of Resolution 678. Once Iraqi troops were
retreating from Kuwait, killing them was not necessary to make them
leave. The states acting under Resolution 678 were not authorized to
reap the "fruits of victory" by inflicting gratuitous damage and loss of
life.
The Bush administration argued, however, that Resolution 678
allowed military action to diminish Iraq's military capacity. In addition
to authorizing Member States to use "all necessary means" to ensure
Iraqi withdrawal, Resolution 678 authorized them to use "all necessary
means" to "restore international peace and security in the area." 8 9 The
Bush administration relied on this language to justify military action
unrelated to forcing Iraq out of Kuwait. It said that reducing Iraq's
offensive capability would ensure peace and security in the region by
making Iraq less able to strike other neighboring states. 90
82. S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1990), reprinted
in 29 I.L.M. 1561 (1990).
83. Christopher Hitchens, Minority Report, NATION, Mar. 25, 1991, at 366.
84. Knut Royce & Timothy M. Phelps, Rout of Iraqis Became Savage "Turkey Shoot,"
NEWSDAY, Mar. 31, 1991, at 7.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Fred Kaplan, General Credits Air Force with Iraqi Army's Defeat, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 16, 1991, at Al.
88. Id.
89. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 12.
90. What the U.N. Resolutions Require of Saddam's Iraq, L.A. TMEs, Feb. 27, 1991, at
B6. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The UN's
Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 480 (1991) (stating that
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Article 42 of the Charter, however, only allows the Security Council
to take military action to deal with an act of aggression. It may not take
military action for the broader purpose of ensuring future peace. The
language in Resolution 678 about restoring international peace and
security was not original but came verbatim from Article 39 of the Char-
ter. To "restore international peace and security" is, according to Arti-
cle 39, the goal of Security Council action taken under Chapter VII.
Article 39 provides: "The Security Council shall determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security." 9' Restoring the peace is thus the end result when
the Security Council stops aggression. To "restore international peace
and security" means to counteract aggression. It imports nothing
broader, such as changing a government in the hope that a government
less inclined to aggression will take its place, or reducing a state's capac-
ity to wage war in the future.
Oscar Schachter and Eugene Rostow9 2 argued that this Article 39
language, as repeated in Resolution 678, justified the effort, as Rostow
put it, "to make it impossible for Iraq to continue the extraordinary
career of conquest it has pursued since 1979." 3 In support, Rostow
cited a statement by Emmerich von Vattel that it is permissible to disable
an aggressor from doing further injury.9 4 But Vattel's view does not
comport with twentieth-century notions of necessity and proportionality
in the use of defensive force. 95 As Schachter has written elsewhere, a
state acting in defense "generally limits itself to force proportionate to
the attack; it does not bomb cities or launch an invasion."96 He noted
that limitations on force are legally required and that the Security Coun-
cil has found actions that exceed the limits of proportionality to consti-
tute unlawful reprisals.9 7 Commenting on Article 39 of the U.N.
Charter, Goodrich, Hambro, and Simons did not discuss the phrase
-restore international peace and security" and apparently did not con-
crippling Iraq's military capacity was an aim not authorized by Resolution 678, but
doubting that such was, in fact, an aim of the actions taken by the U.S. and its allies).
91. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
92. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452,
457 (1991); Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense?,
id. at 506, 514 (1991).
93. Rostow, supra note 92, at 514.
94. Id. (quoting EMMERICH DE VA'rEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS,
bk. II, ch. IV, § 51 (Joseph Chitty trans., 1852 (1758)).
95. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 261-64 (1963). Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1637-38 (1984).
96. Schachter, supra note 95, at 1637.
97. Id. See also Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 33-36 (1972) (on Security Council practice).
Vol. 25
1992 Persian Gulf War
sider it to give the Security Council any additional powers. 98 There is
no indication from the drafting history that the language sanctions the
use of force for any purpose other than counteracting aggression.
In the Security Council debate on Resolution 678, the phrase
"restore international peace and security" received little attention. Only
Yemen mentioned it, expressing concern that states might read it
broadly. "[I]t will be up to those states with military forces in the area to
decide on the prerequisites for the restoration of international peace
and security in the region, which might well lead to a military confronta-
tion on a larger scale." 9 9 This statement has proven quite prescient.
The Bush administration used the phrase for just that purpose. Admin-
istration supporters took the phrase "restore international peace and
security" out of context and gave it a life of its own.' 0 0
E. Amount of Force
Another factor in determining whether the force used against Iraq was
"necessary," as required by Resolution 678, is its magnitude. By way of
"all necessary means," the Security Council did not contemplate a high
level of destruction of Iraq. Explaining its vote on Resolution 678,
Malaysia said that the resolution "does not provide a blank check for
excessive and indiscriminate use of force," and cautioned "against any
action purportedly taken under this resolution that would lead to the
virtual destruction of Iraq."10 The term "necessary" in Resolution 678
imported a notion of proportionality into the action being authorized. It
must be assumed as well that the Security Council contemplated only
use of force that is lawful under the humanitarian law norms that regu-
late the conduct of warfare.
The Bush administration, however, did not limit itself to attacking
the Iraqi army in and around Kuwait. It took the war into the heart of
Iraq, arguing that the air attacks were necessary to destroy the back-up
support that allowed the Iraqi forces in and around Kuwait to function.
The aerial bombardment of Iraq was intense. The United States ran
92,000 air sorties, dropping 88,500 tons of bombs. 10 2 In attacking Iraqi
troop emplacements in and around Kuwait, the U.S. forces used napalm,
cluster bombs, and "daisy cutter" bombs of near-nuclear intensity.
Although the Pentagon claimed that its bombing was very accurate, Air
Force Chief of Staff Gen. McPeak admitted that 70 percent of the bombs
98. LELAND GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNrrED NATIONS: COMMENTARY
AND DOcuMENTs 293-302 (1969).
99. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 33 (statement of Mr. A1-Ashtal,
Yemen).
100. Ethan Bronner, International Experts Defend U.S. Demands of Iraqis, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 27, 1991, at A3 (quoting experts as saying that "restore international
peace" could mean to disarm the Iraqi military).
101. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 76-77 (statement of Mr. Abu Has-
san, Malaysia).
102. Kaplan, supra note 87, at Al.
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the Air Force dropped on Iraq missed their targets.' 0 3 Since much of
the bombing was conducted in urban areas, many of the errant bombs
fell on civilians. As the air war continued, Secretary-General Perez de
Cuellar called it "disturbing" that "civilian casualties are mounting and
that damage to residential areas throughout Iraq has been
widespread."' 0
4
A U.N. team investigated the damage and concluded that the bomb-
ing left Iraq unable to produce industrial goods to any significant
degree. The team called the bombing "near apocalyptic" and said it
reduced life in Iraq to a "pre-industrial stage."10 5 The team found that
the bombing destroyed major economic sites, such as sewage and water
treatment facilities, and electrical generating plants. 10 6 Physicians who
inspected Iraq reported that all seven of Baghdad's water purification
plants were non-functional, and that vibrations and shock waves from
bombs cracked water and sewer mains throughout the city.10 7 As a
result of the destruction of the electrical generating capacity of Bagh-
dad, water could not be pumped through the distribution system.i08
The lack of electricity and water led to infantile diarrhea and other dis-
ease caused by untreated sewage and by the drinking of unsanitary
water. 109
The Bush administration used massive force against Iraq not to
force Iraq out of Kuwait, but to ensure low U.S. casualties and to leave
Iraq without offensive military capability. The high level of force took
the action outside Resolution 678.' 11 The bombing did not meet the
Resolution 678 standard of "necessary" means.1 ii
The bombing of Iraq also violated humanitarian law. Under that
law, military objectives may be targeted, but U.S. commanders appar-
ently construed "military objective" broadly, to include infrastructure
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installations, such as electrical or water-purification installations, that
might support military activity. Moreover, even when strictly military
objectives were targeted, damage to nearby civilian locations was a vir-
tual certainty and therefore such action would violate Protocol I of the
Geneva convention. 1 2 The damage to civilian objectives as assessed by
the U.N. team was too extensive to be excused as inevitable damage inci-
dent to lawful targeting. The administration's bombing of Iraq violated
the rules of warfare by inflicting significant, predictable damage on civil-
ian populations.i 13
F. Compliance with Resolution 678
The Bush administration's contention that its military action against
Iraq conformed to Resolution 678 was weak. The administration
eschewed diplomacy in favor of delivering Iraq an ultimatum to leave
Kuwait. When Iraq signaled its willingness to talk, the administration
did not respond. By refusing to address the Palestinian-Israeli question,
the administration missed an opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully.
Ignoring the pleas of other states, it insisted that "linkage" was inappro-
priate and thus set the course of events firmly in the direction of war.
After the air war devastated Iraq, the administration began a
ground war, even though Iraq had conditionally agreed to withdraw
from Kuwait. Even as Iraq withdrew, the administration maintained its
attack. Moreover, the level of military force the administration brought
to bear both on Iraqi cities and on the Iraqi troops in and around Kuwait
exceeded what was "necessary" to gain Iraq's compliance with Security
Council resolutions.
By exceeding the strictures of Resolution 678, the administration
lost any legal basis for its military action against Iraq. The action there-
fore constituted aggression.
III. The Legality of Resolution 678
Even if the Bush administration complied with Resolution 678, its action
would not be lawful if the resolution were inconsistent with the U.N.
Charter. Certain aspects of Resolution 678 put its conformity to the
Charter in doubt. Chapter VII of the Charter requires that prior to initi-
ating military force, the Security Council must first try less drastic meas-
112. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 51(5) [hereinafter Protocol
Additional] (prohibiting "an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated"). See WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 341 (Air Force Chief of Staff Gen.
McPeak predicted in December 1990 that the bombing of Iraq would kill 2000
civilians.).
113. Protocol Additional, supra note 112, at arts. 48-58.
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ures, or determine that the measures would be fruitless. 1 4 If it begins
military action, the Council must decide the specific parameters and
must retain control over the action taken. 115 It may not give states a
blank check to take military action. Finally, a resolution to initiate mili-
tary action must conform with Charter-mandated voting procedures,
which require the affirmative vote of all five of the Council's permanent
members. 16
A. Military Force as a Measure of Last Resort
In Resolution 678, the Security Council purported to act under Chapter
VII, Articles 39-51, of the U.N. Charter,' 17 which imposes strict require-
ments for a Council decision to use military force. Chapter VII permits
the Council to make a finding of a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or aggression, and then to act to deal with it. Article 39 states
that the "Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make rec-
ommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security."1"8 Article 41 provides:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of commu-
nication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 119
Article 42 provides:
Should the Security Council decide that measures provided for in Article
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. Such action may include demon-
strations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of
Members of the United Nations. 120
Thus, the Chapter VII scheme requires that the Security Council must
first determine whether a breach of the peace has occurred under Article
39, then either take measures not involving the use of force under Arti-
cle 41 or decide that such measures would be inadequate, and then, if
necessary, take military action under Article 42. If, however, the Secur-
ity Council has taken measures not using force, it may proceed to mili-
tary action only after deciding that those measures have proven
inadequate.
114. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-42.
115. Id. arts. 42-49.
116. Id. art. 27.
117. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 12, preambular para. 4.
118. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
119. Id. art. 41.
120. Id. art. 42.
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Some analysts claim that Resolution 678 was a lawful invocation of
Article 42.121 However, that conclusion is not obvious, because the
Security Council is obliged to restore international peace by the least
destructive means. The presence of aggression does not always enable
the Council to use military force to oppose it. To the contrary, the
Council may use military force only if other means will not succeed.
Under Article 39, if the situation can be resolved between the par-
ties directly involved, the Council is obliged to suggest avenues to a
peaceful resolution. In keeping with this obligation, the Council, in its
first resolution on the situation, called on Iraq and Kuwait "to begin
immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differ-
ences." 1 2 2 This was an apparent reference to their dispute over oil
prices, to Iraq's claim that Kuwait was taking oil from beneath Iraqi ter-
ritory, and to its claim for better access to the Gulf.12 3 After making this
initial invitation to Iraq and Kuwait, however, the Council did not return
to the subject in later resolutions and did nothing to bring about such
negotiations. The Council could, in theory, determine that promoting
such negotiations would prove fruitless, but there is nothing in the rec-
ord to suggest that it did so. Moreover, there was reason to believe that
negotiations might work.124 Since it was not clear that negotiations
between the parties would serve no purpose, the Council was on weak
grounds in proceeding to sanctions.
The Security Council then proceeded to measures not involving the
use of force, under Article 41. If the Council determines that Article 41
measures will not suffice, it may dispense with them and move immedi-
ately to military measures. 12 5 However, when, as with Iraq, the Council
uses Article 41 measures, it must, according to Article 42, determine
that the Article 41 measures "have proved to be inadequate" before it
moves to military measures.1 2 6
The Council did not do this in Resolution 678, because it made no
determination about the inadequacy of the trade sanctions. As of
121. See L. C. Green, Iraq, the U.N. and the Law, 29 ALBERTA L. REV. 560, 575
(1991). Green, however, clouds this analysis by stating as well that Resolution 678
contemplated "measures of peacekeeping as understood by the United Nations." Id.
at 576. It is unclear how they could be deemed peacekeeping, since they were to be
taken against the consent of Iraq. "Peacekeeping" is understood, as with UNEF in
Egypt, or UNOC in the Congo, to involve a force inserted with the consent of the
host state. See also Erik Suy, Peace-Keeping Operations in HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONs 379, 387-89 (Ren6-Jean Dupuy ed. 1988).
122. S.C. Res. 660, supra note 5.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
124. See supra note 40.
125. See, e.g., Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization,
San Francisco, Doc. 881, 111/3/46, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 502, 508 (1945) (report of
Rapporteur Mr. Paul-Bancour stating that the drafting committee adopted proposed
language "which gives to the Council the power, when diplomatic, economic, or
other measures are considered by the Council to be inadequate, to undertake such
aerial, naval, or other operations as may be necessary to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security").
126. See O'Connell, supra note 90, at 479.
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November 29, 1990, it was not clear that the sanctions would fail. More
importantly, it was not clear whether they would succeed by January 15,
1991, the date after which the Council implicitly authorized military
action. As of November 29, 1990, the Security Council had no way of
knowing whether the sanctions would, by January 15, 1991, convince
Iraq to leave Kuwait. 12 7 Since the Council did not wait to see whether
economic sanctions would work, military force was not a "necessary"
measure. 1
28
Schachter has argued that Resolution 678 implicitly determined
that the economic sanctions had failed, and therefore that the Council
did, in a rough sense, make a finding to that effect. 129 Finland appar-
ently believed that the Council had made a determination that Article 41
measures had failed. Explaining its vote on Resolution 678, Finland
stated:
According to the Charter, should the Security Council consider that the
economic and diplomatic measures have proved to be inadequate it may
take further action as may be necessary to restore international peace and
security. Acting under these provisions, the Council is simply giving
effect to what is the core of the United Nations system of collective
security.13 0
Yemen chided the Security Council for its impatience with
sanctions.
It is a little surprising that those who used to lecture us on the need to be
patient for sanctions to work when they had to do with Rhodesia or South
Africa are today in such a hurry to declare that those comprehensive and
enforceable sanctions imposed on Iraq are simply not working.13 '
Thus, Yemen too thought the Council was repudiating the sanctions
route, although it did not say that the Council had made a finding that
the sanctions had failed.
127. Schachter noted that as of November 29, 1990, it was "a matter of specula-
tion" whether the trade sanctions would succeed by January 15, 1991. Schachter,
supra note 92, at 456.
128. Richard Falk, Questioning the U.N. Mandate in the Gulf, IFDA DOSSIER 81, Apr.-
June 1991, 81, 82 ("War should not have been authorized, or even threatened by way
of the 15 January deadline ... ").
129. Schachter, supra note 92, at 462 ("[I]t is not unreasonable to infer that the
Council decision authorizing the cooperating states to use force ('all necessary
means') impliedly recognized that sanctions would not prove adequate to compel
Iraqi withdrawal."). See also Adam Roberts, Proper Steps to War, INDEPENDENT
(London), Dec. 19, 1990, at 18 ("[The Council's members had reason to think that,
in the words of Article 42 of the Charter, non-military measures alone 'would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate.' "); Christopher John Sabec, Note, The
Security Council Comes of Age: An Analysis of the International Legal Response to the Iraqi
Invasion of Kuwait, 21 GA.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 63, 99 (1991) (stating that the call in res.
678 for action afterJan. 15, 1991 "appears to be a statement that the council consid-
ered non-military measures to have proved inadequate.").
130. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 84-85 (statement of Mr. Passio,
Finland).
131. Id. at 36 (statement of Mr. AI-Ashtal, Yemen).
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Clearly the Security Council had not made a finding that the sanc-
tions failed as no language appears in Resolution 678 about the Article
41 measures. The Council would, in fact, have been hard pressed to
make such a finding in Resolution 678. Since the Council was implicitly
authorizing military action only after January 15, 1991, it would have
had to say that the Article 41 measures would not succeed by then, and
that, obviously, it could not know.
Council members expressed hope, however, that the threat of mili-
tary action would convince Iraq to comply voluntarily.1 3 2 They viewed
the threat of military force as an additional form of pressure that would
supplement those already in place. Thus, it did not appear that the
Council was declaring the sanctions a failure. The Council's failure to
base military action on a determination that Article 41 measures had
failed violated the Chapter VII procedures and rendered its implicit call
for military measures unlawful. 13 3
B. The Delegation of Decision-Making Power in Resolution 678
The most serious decision the Security Council can make is to authorize
the use of military force. The Council must clearly determine the need
for force, and clearly decide to use it. Yet Resolution 678 called for
unspecified "necessary" action at a date six weeks hence, leading Yemen
to call it "broad and vague." 13 4 Yemen's representative said, "it's just a
blanket authorization, and is one of the most dangerous resolutions that
the U.N. Security Council has adopted in its history." 135
Even though the understanding in the Security Council was that
Resolution 678 authorized military force,136 the resolution did not
expressly say so. In failing to call for military force in explicit terms, the
Council played loose with the Article 42 requirement of an express find-
ing of the need for military force. 13 7 Article 42 'states that the Security
Council may take action by air, sea, or land forces. For the state that is
the object of such action, the consequences can obviously be devastat-
ing. If the Council is to take such action, it must address it directly and
decide explicitly that it is necessary. It may not conceal such a momen-
132. Id. at 74 (statement of Mr. Clark, Canada); Id. at 82 (statement of Mr. Hurd,
U.K.).
133. See Urquhart, supra note 23, at 35; Richard Falk, Force and War in the United
Nations System 17-18 (paper presented at Conference, "The U.N. between War and
Peace," Rome, Apr. 15-16, 1991, manuscript on file with the Cornell Int'l LawJournal).
134. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 33 (statement of Mr. A1-Ashtal,
Yemen).
135. Eventually There Can Only Be an Arab Solution, MIDDLE EAST REPORT, Mar.-Apr.
1991, at 8, 9 (interview with Amb. A1-Ashtal).
136. See supra note 14.
137. Charalambos Apostolidis, L'autorisation du Conseil de S6curitE d'utiliser
tous les moyens nrcessaires dans la Resolution 678 4 (paper presented at Confer-
ence, "The U.N. between War and Peace," Rome, Apr. 15-16, 1991, manuscript on
file with the Cornell Int'l Law Journal).
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tous decision in metaphorical language.' 3 8 Stipulating that states might
take "all necessary means" is too imprecise an authorization for war.
By stating that the Security Council "may take such action," Article
42 implies that the Council is to organize the action. Resolution 678 did
not do that, but authorized any of the Member States to act. The Coun-
cil let each Member State decide whether to initiate military force
against Iraq. By allowing any Member State to decide whether force was
necessary on a date six weeks hence, the Council failed to follow Chap-
ter VII procedures. The basic postulate of Chapter VII is that the Coun-
cil, and not individual states, decides when to use military force. 13 9
This, indeed, distinguished the U.N. Charter from the Covenant of the
League of Nations. Under the Covenant, the League Council could only
recommend what force to use in case of aggression. If the League
Council recommended and a state acted on the recommendation, the
decision was that of the state, not of the League Council. 140
The U.N. Charter deprived states of the power to determine when
to use force and gave that power to the Security Council. 14 1 By permit-
ting each state to make that determination, Resolution 678 turned the
Charter system on its head. Cuba objected, with good reason, that Res-
olution 678 "violates the Charter of the United Nations by authorizing
some states to use military force in total disregard of the procedures
established by the Charter."' 142
The Security Council, moreover, did not establish a mechanism to
ensure that Member States acting under Resolution 678 would coordi-
nate strategy among themselves. The resolution thus left open the pos-
sibility that different states might act at cross-purposes. The only
wording that served to ensure uniformity of action identified the states
authorized to use force as the "Member States cooperating with the
Government of Kuwait." Perhaps all those states would follow a com-
mon plan, but perhaps they would not. Although the Security Council
could have reconvened to settle such problems, in a fast-moving situa-
tion there was no assurance it would have the opportunity.
Explaining its vote for Resolution 678, Malaysia referred to the dan-
ger in the Council's failure to clarify how a final decision to use force
against Iraq would be made. The Malaysian representative stated that
"[a]ny proposed use of force must be brought before the Council for its
prior approval, in accordance with the specific provisions of Chapter VII
138. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 334 (stating that the U.S. wanted an explicit call
for use of force, but that when it tried to convince the USSR to approve such a reso-
lution, the USSR objected to including language about use of force, and the phrase
"all necessary means" was devised as a compromise).
139. Louis Cavare, Les sanctions dans le Pacte de la S.D.N. et dans la Charte des N. U, 54
REVUE GgNiRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 647, 660 (1950).
140. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 16, para. 2. See also GOODRICH ET AL., supra
note 98, at 315; Cavare, supra note 139, at 650.
141. Cavare, supra note 139, at 648. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 98, at 315.
142. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 58 (statement of Mr. Malmierca
Peoli, Cuba). See also A Pause of Goodwill, supra note 14, at 49.
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of the Charter. We regret that this point is not clearly reflected in this
resolution, a precedent that may not bode well for the future." 14 3 Thus,
Malaysia did not believe that Resolution 678 alone constituted an
authorization to use military force. In its view, another Security Council
vote was required, because only the Council may decide to initiate mili-
tary force.
Malaysia was correct. Chapter VII requires that the Security Coun-
cil make the determination to use military force. However, no other
state that voted in the majority on Resolution 678 supported Malaysia
on this point, and as a result the decision to use military force was left to
each Member State.
There is only one situation when the Security Council may send a
military force outside Article 42, namely, when it sends a military force
into a state with that state's consent, as it did in the Congo in 1960. In
such a situation the Council is not directing force against any state and
thus is not undertaking enforcement action. 144 Although the Charter
basis for peace-keeping operations is unclear, 14 5 they violate the rights
of no state since they are taken with the consent of the host state and are
directed against no state.1 4 6 The action taken against Iraq was, how-
ever, without Iraq's consent, and thus can be justified only under Article
42.
C. Security Council Control
Resolution 678 was also legally suspect because it did not establish
Security Council control over actions. Chapter VII contemplates that
enforcement action will occur at the direction of the Security Council.
By stating that the Council "may take such action," Article 42 requires
that the Council direct the action, define military objectives, and decide
when to terminate hostilities.1 4 7 Resolution 678, however, did not
envisage Security Council control; it only required states to "keep the
Council regularly informed on the progress of actions" they might take.
The Council retained control over neither the initiation of hostilities nor
over their subsequent course.' 48
Yemen objected to the lack of control mechanisms, stating that the
resolution
is not related to a specific Article of Chapter VII of the Charter; hence the
Security Council will have no control over those forces, which will fly their
143. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 76 (statement of Mr. Abu Hassan,
Malaysia).
144. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.CJ. 151, 175 (Jul. 20);
Schachter, supra note 92, at 461; Suy, supra note 121, at 380-83.
145. Suy, supra note 121, at 380-83.
146. Id. at 387-89.
147. O'Connell, supra note 90, at 465 ("The Charter calls for the U.N. itself, not a
small group of members, to do the countering.").
148. Falk, supra note 128, at 82 ("[Ihe U.N. had an obligation to control the defi-
nition of war goals, the means chosen to achieve them and to use its authority to
impose a ceasefire.").
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own national flags. Further, the command of those forces will have noth-
ing to do with the United Nations, although their actions will have been
authorized by the Security Council. 149
Malaysia voted for Resolution 678, but was concerned that the reso-
lution did not establish the accountability demanded by Chapter VII.
"When the United Nations Security Council provides the authorization
for countries to use force, these countries are fully accountable for their
actions to the Council through a clear system of reporting and accounta-
bility, which is not adequately covered in Resolution 678."150
The requirement of Security Council control in Article 42 becomes
even clearer when Article 42 is contrasted to Article 41. The Article 42
language ("may take such action") stands in sharp contrast to the lan-
guage of Article 41, which deals with economic and diplomatic sanc-
tions. Article 41 provides that the Council "may call upon the Members
of the United Nations to apply such measures." Thus, Article 41 con-
templates that the Council set the economic or diplomatic sanctions and
then ask Member States to comply. No such proviso was written into
Article 42, meaning that the Council was not simply to decide that mili-
tary measures were appropriate and then ask Member States to take
such measures. Rather, Article 42 requires the Council itself to direct
the action.
With Korea in 1950, the Council came closer to complying with this
requirement than it did with Iraq. There it decided that the United
Nations should take military action and set up a command under the
U.N. flag. By delegating the command, as it did to the United States, the
Council relinquished much of its control, 15 1 but in Resolution 678 the
Council made not the slightest effort to exert any control.
The need for Security Council control is also apparent in Articles 46
and 47 of the Charter. Article 46 provides: "Plans for the application of
armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of
the Military Staff Committee." 1 52 The committee, according to Article
47, is composed of the chiefs of staff of the five permanent members of
the Security Council.
15 3
Although the Military Staff Committee lay dormant during the Cold
War years, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev suggested that the Committee manage any Council
action. 15 4 Following the Security Council's call for a trade embargo
149. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 33 (statement of Mr. Al-Ashtal,
Yemen).
150. Id. at 76 (statement of Mr. Abu Hassan, Malaysia).
151. S.C. Res. 84, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 476th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/Rev.I
(1950).
152. U.N. CHARTER art. 46.
153. Id. art. 47.
154. FrankJ. Prial, Crisis Breathes Life into a Moribund U.N. Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
6, 1990, at A20. The Committee met to discuss the Council's economic sanctions.
Paul Lewis, Security Council's Military Panel Reviews Naval Efforts to Enforce Trade Embargo,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1990, at Al l. See also Paul Lewis, Soviet Announces Shift on U.N.
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against Iraq, the Bush administration met with the other permanent
members of the Council to explore whether the Military Staff Commit-
tee could coordinate state-initiated blockade activities to enforce the
embargo. 15 5
These meetings produced no positive results, however, and the Mil-
itary Staff Committee played no role in coordinating the eventual block-
ade.1 5 6 Resolution 678 likewise made no mention of a role for the
Military Staff Committee. The Iraqi representative, speaking in the
Security Council during the debate on Resolution 678, objected that
"only collective action under the command and control of the Security
Council, in coordination with the Military Staff Committee, can lead to
the use of force against any country, and no individual Member State
may be authorized to lynch a particular country for any reason." Iraq
accused the Council of ignoring the Charter. "Regrettably," it said,
"the Council apparently thought that in this case the legal requirements
were disposable niceties." 15 7
The reason Resolution 678 provided for no control was that the
Bush administration, which drafted the resolution, did not want to be
constrained. When Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan suggested that
troops for the Iraq action be placed under the Military Staff Committee,
Secretary Baker objected that then "you begin getting into questions of
whether or not there should be a U.N. command of forces, whether or
not the Military Staff Committee should give directions to the multina-
tional force, and questions of that kind, which we do not think, under
these circumstances, are things that we ought to invite." 15 8
Like Senator Moynihan, former U.N. Undersecretary-General Brian
Urquhart criticized Resolution 678 for disregarding the Military Staff
Committee and wrote that "Articles 46 and 47 clearly imply that
enforcement measures under chapter VII would be under the control of
the Council and its Military Staff Committee .... but no such control
was provided for."' 159
The danger in the Council's failure to establish control became evi-
dent immediately after Resolution 678 was adopted. The Council had
no control over whether the Bush administration would negotiate with
Iraq before launching a military invasion; once the administration
attacked, it, rather than the Council, made all tactical decisions, includ-
Staff Demanded by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1988, at Al (proposal by Gorbachev to
revive Military Staff Committee).
155. U.S. State Dept., Regular Briefing (Margaret Tutwiler), FEDERAL INFORMATION
SYSTEMS CORP., Aug. 14, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File).
156. S.C. Res. 665, supra note 9.
157. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 21 (statement of Mr. A1-Anbari,
Iraq).
158. U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, supra note 34, at 157 (statements of Sen. Moyni-
han and Secretary Baker).
159. Urquhart, supra note 23, at 34. Contra Sabec, supra note 129, at 100 ("[T]here
is little basis for the position that the Military Staff committee must direct military
operations conducted in the name of the Security Council.").
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ing the decision to begin a ground war. Further, once Iraq stated it
would withdraw from Kuwait, the administration decided to continue
fighting. 160 If the Military Staff Committee had controlled the action, it
might well have decided to desist at that point.
As the fighting continued, Secretary-General P6rez de Cuellar com-
plained that "what we know about the war" is
what we hear from the three members of the Security Council which are
involved-Britain, France and the United States-which every two or
three days report to the Council, after the actions have taken place.
The Council, which has authorised all this, is informed only after the
military actions have taken place. As I am not a military expert I cannot
evaluate how necessary are the military actions taking place now.1 61
The Secretary-General's complaint stemmed from the failure of the
Council to have the Military Staff Committee direct the action. Military
officers on the Committee could have informed the Council whether the
actions being taken were "necessary," as required by Resolution 678.
As matters stood, the Council could only sit back and hope the states
taking action were not doing more than was needed. This absence of
Security Council control violated the requirements of Chapter VII. t6 2
D. China's Abstention
A final problem with Resolution 678 was that China, a permanent mem-
ber of the Security Council, abstained from the vote.' 6 3 Article 27 of
the Charter specifies that in votes on non-procedural issues, Security
Council decisions must be taken "by an affirmative vote of nine mem-
bers including the concurring votes of the permanent members."' t64 With
China abstaining, it is not clear that this requirement was satisfied.
The reference in Article 27 to the votes of "the permanent mem-
bers" could be read to refer either to those permanent members who
are present, or to those that cast a vote, as opposed to abstaining. This
phrase appears in the four official Charter languages other than English,
however, as "all the permanent members."' 6 5 Thus, the Charter
appears to require the concurring votes of all five permanent members.
The phrase "concurring votes" has been a source of confusion
because some read it to include an abstention, in addition to an affirma-
tive vote. The phrase "concurring votes" is not used in all five official
160. Falk, supra note 133, at 17-18 (referring to "the duck shoot" against Iraqi
troops withdrawing from Kuwait, and saying that this shows that the Security Council
did not properly limit and minimize the use of force).
161. Leonard Doyle, U.N. "Has No Role in Running War," INDEPENDENT (London),
Feb. 11, 1991, at 2 (interview with Prez de Cuellar).
162. See Weston, supra note 44, at 527 (stating that the lack of Security Council
control under Resolution 678 was "not what the U.N. founders and Charter drafters
had in mind").
163. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 65-66.
164. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 3 (emphasis supplied).
165. Id.
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texts of the Charter. It appears only in the Russian and English texts. 166
The Chinese text uses "agreement" of all the permanent members,
without specifically mentioning a vote.' 6 7 The French text omits "con-
curring" and requires the affirmative votes to constitute a majority,
including "the votes" of all the permanent members.16 8 The Spanish
text also omits "concurring" and similarly requires the affirmative votes
to constitute a majority, but then states that these must include the
"affirmative votes" of all the permanent members.1 6 9
Thus, in the five official texts there are four different formulations:
concurring votes (English and Russian), agreement (Chinese), votes-
with an implication that this means affirmative (French), and affirmative
votes (Spanish). According to the Charter, all five texts are equally
authentic,' 7 0 and when texts vary in official languages they must, under
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, be reconciled. 17 1 While
the English, Russian, and Chinese texts are ambiguous on the effect of
an abstention by a permanent member, the French text implies, and the
Spanish text clearly implies that an abstention is to be deemed a veto.
The English, Russian, and Chinese texts could be read to include an
abstention as satisfying the requirement, but the implication is to the
contrary, namely, that the permanent member must express approval of
the resolution, which can be done only by voting affirmatively. Since the
French and Spanish texts are clearer, the others must be read to con-
form to them. 172 Thus, a textual analysis of Article 27 leads to the con-
clusion that an abstention by a permanent member on a non-procedural
issue constitutes a veto.
166. The Russian text reads "Resheniia Soveta Bezopasnosti po vsem drugim
voprosam schtaiutsia priniatymi, kogda za nikh podani golosa semi chlenov Soveta,
vkluchaia sovpadaiushchie golosa vsekh postoiannykh chlenov Soveta . . ." U.N.
CHARTER art. 27, 3 (Russian text available in 59 Stat. 1031, 1132).
167. The Chinese text reads "An Quan Li Shi Hui dui yu qi ta yi qie shi xiang zhijue
yi, ying yi ... zhi kejue piao bao kuo quan ti chang ren li shi guo zhi tong yi piao biao
jue zhi .... U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 3 (Chinese text available in 59 Stat. 1097,
1103).
168. The French text reads, "Les d6cisions du Conseil de S6curit6 sur toutes
autres questions sont prises par un vote affirmatif... dans lequel sont comprises les
voix de tous les membres permanents.. ." U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 3 (French text
available in 59 Stat. 1065, 1072).
169. The Spanish text reads, "Las decisiones del Consejo de Seguridad sobre
todas las demis cuestiones sein tomadas por el voto afirmativo ... incluso los votos
afirmativos de todos los miembros permanentes . . ." U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 3
(Spanish text available in 59 Stat. 1157, 1164).
170. U.N. CHARTER art. 111.
171. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 33(4), opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M.
679 (1969).
172. See LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATiONS: COMMENTARY AND DOcuMENTs 133 (1946); Leo Gross, Voting in the Security
Council: Abstention from Voting and Absencefrom Meetings, 60 YALE L.J. 209, 210 (1951).
But see Myres S. McDougal & Richard N. Gardner, The Veto and the Charter: An Interpre-
tation for Survival, 60 YALE L. J. 258, 260-61 (1951) (arguing that an abstention by a
permanent member is not a veto); GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 98, at 230-31 (stating
that permanent members do not in practice regard voluntary abstention as veto).
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By abstaining, a state does not convey the opposition that would be
communicated by a veto. Similarly, an abstention does not affirmatively
express agreement. Explaining its abstention on Resolution 678, China
said it could not vote in favor because it construed Resolution 678 as
authorizing military force; China opposed that approach and preferred a
peaceful solution. China said that it abstained, instead of voting in the
negative, because it supported the resolution's call on Iraq to comply
with prior Council resolutions. 173 This explanation indicated that
China disagreed with the essence of Resolution 678, as construed by the
members, namely, that it opposed the use of military force against Iraq.
Since China stated its opposition to the essence of Resolution 678, it is
difficult to construe its abstention as an "affirmative vote."
The drafting history of Article 27 relevant to the question of absten-
tions by permanent members is not extensive, 174 but the five permanent
members of the Security Council all thought that a voluntary abstention
by a permanent member would constitute a veto, 175 and early commen-
tary construed Article 27 to that effect. 176 The approval of the perma-
nent members was deemed a prerequisite to the success of military
action, because opposition by a major power would detract from the
moral force of the Security Council decision to act, as well as from the
practical possibility of implementing the decision.
On the occasions when the issue has arisen, the Security Council
has not considered an abstention by a permanent member a veto. Even
when permanent members have abstained on votes, the Council has
nonetheless considered the resolution adopted if it gained the requisite
173. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 62-63 (statement of Mr. Ojan
Qjchen, China). See also A Pause of Goodwill, supra note 14, at 49.
174. Constantin A. Stavropoulos, The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by Permanent
Members of the Security Council Under Article 27, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United
Nations, 61 AM.J. INT'L L. 737, 739-42 (1967).
175. Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Fran-
cisco, Doc. 852, III/1/37, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 710, 713 (1945) (Statement by the
Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Secur-
ity Council):
In view of the primary responsibilities of the permanent members, they could
not be expected, in the present condition of the world, to assume the obliga-
tion to act in so serious a matter as the maintenance of international peace
and security in consequence of a decision in which they had not concurred.
Therefore, ifa majority voting in the Security Council is to be made possible,
the only practicable method is to provide, in respect of non-procedural deci-
sions, for unanimity of the permanent members plus the concurring votes of
at least two of the non-permanent members.
Id. See also Minutes of the Nineteenth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed
Amendments, Held at San Francisco, June 11, 1945, 3p.m., 1 FOR. REL. U.S. 1256, 1258-
60 (1945) (USSR, U.K., U.S., China, France say that voluntary abstention is a veto).
176. See Hans Kelsen, Organization and Procedure of the Security Council of the United
Nations, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1087, 1098 (1946) ("The wording of Article 27, paragraph
3, hardly allows an interpretation other than that, if one or more of the representa-
tives of the five permanent members are not present or abstain from voting, no valid
non-procedural decision can be taken."); GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 172, at
133.
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majority. 177 Under the rules of treaty interpretation, one should take
into account any practice of the party states "which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." 1 7 8 Most such
instances of the adoption of non-procedural resolutions on which a per-
manent member has abstained, however, have involved decisions of con-
siderably less moment than Resolution 678.179
The Security Council makes decisions under a number of Charter
chapters, and few of the abstentions by permanent members in the
Security Council's history have come on votes under Chapter VII. Fur-
ther, when a permanent member has abstained on a Chapter VII matter,
it has typically expressed a reason that did not go to the heart of the
action contemplated. For example, in 1948 when the USSR abstained
from a resolution finding a threat to the peace and ordering ceasefire in
Palestine, it did not object to the finding of a threat to the peace or to
the ceasefire call, but it had views about an appropriate settlement that
were not addressed by the Council. °8 0 In 1966 France and the USSR
abstained on a resolution declaring a threat to the peace in Rhodesia
and calling on the United Kingdom to prevent, by force if necessary, the
arrival at the port of Beira of vessels believed to be carrying oil to Rho-
desia; 18 1 France and the USSR also abstained on a resolution finding a
threat to the peace and imposing Article 41 sanctions against Rhode-
sia.18 2 But in both cases, they did not object to the essence of the reso-
lutions. France did not consider the Rhodesian situation to be an
international matter, but rather a domestic matter for the United King-
dom, and therefore did not find it a threat to the peace. However,
France did not object to Britain taking action to put down the minority
regime in Rhodesia.' 8 3 The USSR abstained because it advocated
stronger action against the minority regime in Rhodesia, but did not
oppose the action contemplated in the resolution.' 8 4
Some of the most serious decisions that may be made under Chap-
ter VII are those calling for military enforcement action. Leo Gross,
after reciting instances of abstention during the Security Council's first
few years, wrote in 1951:
It should be noted at this point, however, that the usefulness of agree-
ment by sufferance has its limits. There is no case on record where the
177. GOODRICH Er AL., supra note 98, at 231; Stavropoulos, supra note 174, at 742;
SYDNEY D. BAILEY, VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 69 (1969).
178. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 171, art. 31(3).
179. 2 Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs 97-103 (1955). Id., 2 Supp.
No. 1, at 276 (1958). Id., 2 Supp. No. 2, at 314 (1964). Id., 2 Supp. No. 3, at 74-77.
Id., 2 Supp. No. 5, at 48-54 (1986).
180. See Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 338th mtg. at 21-43, U.N. Doc. S/
PV.338 (1948) (discussing S.C. Res. 54).
181. See Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1277th mtg. at 38, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.1277 (1966) (abstaining on S.C. Res. 221).
182. See Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1340th mtg. at 26, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.1340 (1966) (abstaining on S.C. Res. 232).
183. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 181, at 20-21.
184. Id. at 24.
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Security Council has adopted a resolution under Article 39 or otherwise
recommending or deciding the use of armed force, and where a perma-
nent member agreed by abstaining. This is as might be expected. It
seems inconceivable that a permanent member would abstain from voting
if a resolution looking to the use of force were put to the vote.18 5
What Gross thought inconceivable, the Security Council did in Resolu-
tion 678. Never before in Council practice had that been done on a
resolution contemplating the use of armed force.18 6
An abstention by a permanent member on an Article 42 decision is
inconsistent with Chapter VII procedures for the additional reason that
the five permanent members are to direct the military action through the
Military Staff Committee, which includes a chief of staff from each of the
five members.1 8 7 If a permanent member objects to the military action,
as China did, it can hardly fulfill its role of directing the action. One
must conclude, therefore, that the Charter procedure for use of force by
the Security Council assumes the approval of the permanent members.
China, to be sure, did not consider its abstention on Resolution 678
to constitute a veto, nor did the other Council members. That, however,
does not resolve the matter, because Member States not represented on
the Security Council, particularly Iraq, have a right to expect the Council
to follow proper procedures when making important decisions.1 8
China's abstention, particularly in light of its objection to military action
against Iraq, cast serious doubt on the conformity of Resolution 678 to
the Charter.
E. Conformity of Resolution 678 to the U.N. Charter
In summary, Resolution 678 violated the U.N. Charter in several signifi-
cant ways. It was not based upon the required determination that the
Article 41 measures that had been taken were inadequate and thus
authorized military force where it might not have been necessary. It did
not clearly determine when to use military force but left that determina-
tion to whichever Member States might choose to act. It established no
mechanism of control over the military action taken by Member States
and thereby abdicated its responsibility to direct action taken under its
authority.' 8 9 Finally, China's disagreement with the use of military
action against Iraq deprived the action of the required support and
threatened the directional role of the permanent members.
185. Gross, supra note 172, at 228.
186. On the resolution calling for military action in Korea, however, the USSR was
absent, and its absence was not deemed by the Council to constitute a veto. S.C. Res.
84, supra note 151.
187. U.N. CHARTER art. 47.
188. Falk, supra note 133, at 10.
189. See Weston, supra note 44, at 518, 522 (finding Resolution 678 deficient for its
ambiguity and for lack of Council control, finding no basis for Resolution 678 in any
Article of Chapter VII and concluding that the resolution was technically lawful as an
appropriate Council-initiated expansion of Council powers, but lacking in legitimacy
because of its deficiencies).
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The Charter provisions permitting the U.N. to impose military sanc-
tions represented an important advance over prior law and opened the
possibility of effective measures to stop aggression. However, the Char-
ter's drafters established procedures that would ensure that the action
be that of the U.N. and not individual states. By circumventing the
Chapter VII procedures, the Security Council did something not only
quite different from what the drafters envisaged, but at odds with their
conception of international enforcement.
IV. Possible Security Council Power under Article 39
Two arguments have been made to justify the military action in the Per-
sian Gulf; both seek to avoid the strictures of Article 42 of the Charter.
The first argument attempts to locate in Article 39 a Security Council
power to initiate enforcement action. The second attempts to locate in
Article 51 a right to act in the defense of Kuwait.
As indicated above, Article 39 states that if the Council finds aggres-
sion it may "make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security."'190
An argument has been made that the Security Council may, in addi-
tion to organizing military action under Article 42, recommend to states
under Article 39 that they take action.1 9 1 The argument relies on the
precedent of Security Council Resolution 84, which called for military
action in Korea in 1950.192 In that resolution, the Council "recom-
mend[ed] that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance
to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack
and to restore international peace and security in the area."1 9 3 Under
Article 42, however, the Council decides. It does not recommend. The only
Article in Chapter VII that mentions recommendations is Article 39.
Thus, some analysts have concluded that the Security Council intended
to base the Korean resolution on Article 39 alone. 19 4
Hans Kelsen, who shared this analysis of the Security Council's
intent, criticized the Korea resolution as an improper recommendation
not authorized by Chapter VII. Kelsen wrote that the Article 39 power
190. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
191. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The United States Commitment to the Norms of the United
Nations and Its Related Agencies, 1 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 131 n.17
(1991) ("[S]ince the military action that began afterJanuary 15, 1991, was not under
the control of the Security Council and was not taken pursuant to Article 43 agree-
ments, it may be viewed as Chapter VII enforcement action without necessarily fall-
ing under Article 42.").
192. See Charles Chaumont, L'Equilibre des organes politiques des Nations Unies et la crise
de l'organisation, 11 ANNUAIRE FRAN9AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 428, 436-37 (1965);
Rostow, supra note 92, at 521-22 (Rostow, however, rejected the analogy); see also
infra note 194 and accompanying text.
193. S.C. Res. 84, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/5/Rev.1
(1950) (emphasis supplied).
194. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 98, at 315.
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to make recommendations does not include the power to recommend an
enforcement action. He wrote:
It is doubtful whether a recommendation of an enforcement action corre-
sponds to the intention of those who framed the Charter .... If the
Security Council, after having determined under Article 39 the existence
of a threat to, or breach of, the peace, is of the opinion that enforcement
measures are necessary to maintain or restore international peace, the
Council must take these measures itself by acting under Article 41 or 42
195
Rostow says that in Resolution 678 the Security Council did not rely
on Article 39 alone, as evidenced by the fact that it "authorized" state
action, instead of "recommending" action.' 96 If the Security Council in
the Korean situation acted under Article 39 alone, however, it was on
thin legal ice, because when Article 39 referred to recommendations, it
did not mean recommendations that Member States take military action
against an aggressor.' 97 The reference was rather to recommendations
designed to counsel the parties to the conflict regarding ways to achieve
resolution. The import of Article 39 is that when the Council finds
aggression, it may move in either of two directions, or both. First, it may
propose to the aggressor and the victim a plan that might lead to a reso-
lution of the conflict. That is what is meant by "recommendation" in
Article 39. Second, it may call for enforcement action under Articles 41
or 42. The Council's inappropriate use of the word "recommend" in
the Korean situation does not legalize an Article 39 route to military
action as an alternative to Article 42. If the Council in the Korea resolu-
tion attempted to base its action on Article 39 alone, it acted contrary to
the Charter.
Article 39 must be read in conjunction with Article 36 of Chapter VI
of the Charter. Chapter VI deals with disputes that do not involve a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or aggression. In dealing with
such disputes, Article 36 empowers the Security Council to "recom-
mend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" to the parties
to the dispute.' 9 8 Article 39's "recommendation" language is an ana-
logue for the situation involving a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or aggression. It allows the Security Council to devise a "recom-
mendation" to the parties for a peaceful settlement of their conflict.1 99
The committee that drafted Article 39 explained that by using the
word "recommendations" it intended
195. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 932 (1950).
196. Rostow, supra note 92, at 521.
197. Suy, supra note 121, at 381 (Regarding the Security Council action on Korea,
"[t]he Organization endeavoured in this case to preserve its military enforcement
capability by means which were not strictly in accordance with the explicit provisions
for that purpose in the Charter. The highly sensitive issues raised by this venture
caused this type of experiment not to be repeated, however.").
198. U.N. CHARTER art. 36, 1.
199. Weston, supra note 44, at 521. (Article 39 recommendations involve recom-
mendations under Chapter VI for peaceful resolution).
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to show that the action of the Council so far as it relates to the peaceful
settlement of a dispute or to situations giving rise to a threat of war, a
breach of the peace, or aggression, should be considered as governed by
the provisions contained in Section A.20 0
What at that time was "Section A" became Chapter VI in the final text of
the Charter.20 1 Chapter VI provides Security Council procedures for
handling disputes that do not amount to a threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or aggression. The idea thus was that whenever the Council
makes recommendations to the parties-whether or not their situation
amounts to a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or aggression-
Chapter VI should apply.
Further, if the Security Council could lawfully recommend under
Article 39 that states take military action against an aggressor, this
would defeat the Charter concept that the Council must either utilize or
rule out economic and diplomatic sanctions first. Thus, the drafters did
not view Article 39 as an alternative route to military action.
One feature of Chapter VII, however, has been invoked to cast
doubt on this analysis. The Charter drafters contemplated that when
the Security Council decided on Article 42 sanctions, it would use mili-
tary forces provided by Member States under Article 43. Article 43 calls
on Member States to contribute standing forces for the use of the Coun-
cil should Article 42 sanctions be imposed.20 2 States have not contrib-
uted such forces, however. This failure has led to a view that Article 42
is inoperative, because the Council lacks the standing forces necessary
to carry out Article 42 enforcement action. This view finds some sup-
port in Article 106 of the Charter, which provides for transitional meas-
ures pending the conclusion of Article 43 agreements. Article 106
reads:
Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in
Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the
exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-
Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, 30 October 1943, and France,
shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declara-
tion, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Mem-
bers of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of
the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security. 203
This language suggests that Article 42 action should be taken with
Article 43 troops.20 4 Nothing in Chapter VII, however, precludes the
Council from calling on Member States to contribute forces for a partic-
200. Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Fran-
cisco, Doc. 943, 111/5, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 12, 19 (1945).
201. Id.
202. U.N. CHARTER art. 43.
203. Id. art. 106.
204. This was the view taken by Iraq in the Security Council discussion leading to
the adoption of Resolution 678. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 21 (Mr.
AI-Anbari, Iraq). After referring to Article 106 Iraq's representative stated,
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ular operation. Such a route is more difficult for the Council than if it
had the Article 43 troops, but Chapter VII does not explicitly make the
use of Article 42 dependent on the availability of Article 43 troops.20 5
While Article 106 can be read to mean that Article 42 action may only be
taken by Article 43 troops, Article 106 contemplates flexibility to ensure
that peace may be maintained pending the availability of Article 43
troops.
In the Certain Expenses20 6 case, the International Court of Justice
found such flexibility in Chapter VII. Some states had refused to pay
expenses for the U.N. military operation in the Congo on the grounds
that the participating national military contingents were not organized
under Article 43. The Court replied:
[A]n argument which insists that all measures taken for the maintenance
of international peace and security must be financed through agreements
concluded under Article 43, would seem to exclude the possibility that
the Security Council might act under some other Article of the Charter.
The Court cannot accept so limited a view of the powers of the Security
Council under the Charter. It cannot be said that the Charter has left the
Security Council impotent in the face of an emergency situation when
agreements under Article 43 have not been concluded. 2 07
In Certain Expenses, Judge Bustamante wrote in his dissenting opin-
ion that the unavailability of Article 43 forces should not frustrate the
Council in acting to maintain or restore the peace. "In that event, the
Security Council must fill the gap by means of direct measures .... No
other means would appear to be available to the Organization but the
formation of a special Force for the operations. ' 20 8 This is the most
logical reading of Chapter VII. The fact that no Article 43 agreements
were made, as two analysts have written, "does not signify a lapse in the
[w]hen the Security Council fails to reach special agreements with Member
Countries to have forces of those countries put under Security Council com-
mand, the four countries that signed the Moscow Declaration of October
1943, together with France, and in consultation with the Members of the
United Nations, can undertake joint action against any country.
Id.
205. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 98, at 631.
206. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (Advisory Opinion of
July 20).
207. Certain Expenses, 1962 I.CJ. at 167. Schachter uses the quoted language to
argue that the Court in Certain Expenses said that military action by the Security Coun-
cil did not have to be based on Article 42. He quotes the Court's statement that
"[t]he Court cannot accept so limited a view of the powers of the Security Council."
Schachter, supra note 92, at 461. However, Schachter's quote uses this sentence out
of context. As indicated by the full paragraph in which the sentence appears, the
Court was referring only to a situation in which the Council did not have Article 43
military forces at its disposal. The Court was not suggesting that the Council has
some source of authority for enforcement action apart from Article 42.
208. Certain Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 298 (dissenting opinion ofJudge Bustamante).
See also Chaumont, supra note 192, at 436-37 (stating that since Article 43 troops do
not exist, the Council may itself form a troop force for a particular operation).
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Organization's general police power, set out in Article 42."2 09
Thus, the only means, consistent with the Charter, for the Security
Council to organize an enforcement action is first to make an Article 39
finding of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or aggression, then
to try non-military sanctions and find them inadequate (or, alternatively,
decide from the start that they would be inadequate), and finally pro-
ceed to decide on military action under Article 42.
V. The Military Action Against Iraq as Collective Self-Defense
Several analysts, including Rostow and Schachter, argued, in support of
the military action against Iraq, that Resolution 678 contemplated action
that was lawful as collective self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter.2 10 They made two distinct but related arguments: (a) that Res-
olution 678 was valid because the Security Council has power under
Article 51 to call for action in collective self-defense, and (b) that the
military action against Iraq was lawful as collective self-defense under-
taken by the states involved under Article 51, wholly apart from Resolu-
tion 678.
The Bush administration did not analyze Resolution 678 along
these lines. While it deemed Resolution 678 to be valid under Chapter
VII, it did not explain precisely which Articles in Chapter VII apply. As
for the possibility that the action might be lawful collective self-defense
apart from Resolution 678, the administration had, prior to the adop-
tion of Resolution 678, said it had a right to defend Kuwait with military
force even without a Security Council decision.2 1 1
In August 1990, after the Security Council called for a trade
embargo against Iraq, but before it initiated a blockade to enforce the
embargo, the United States began blockade activity on its own and con-
tended that the action was lawful under Article 51. 2 12 During the
autumn of 1990, the U.S. argued that it had a right to attack Iraq in the
collective self-defense of Kuwait under Article 51.213 In early Novem-
ber 1990, Secretary-General P6rez de Cuellar dealt the collective self-
209. Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, U.N. Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old
Order Changeth," 85 AM.J. INT'L L. 63, 66 (1991).
210. Schachter, supra note 92, at 457-62; Rostow, supra note 92, at 508-09.
211. See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
212. U.S. State Dept., Regular Briefing, supra note 155 ("The United States position
is that the actions we are taking are clearly legal under international law, Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter. The actions we're taking will assist in making the sanctions
effective.").
213. See John M. Broder, Iraqi Military Hampered by Critical Shortages, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1990, at A6 (quoting Secretary of Defense Cheney as saying, with respect to
potential U.S. attack against Iraq, "Given the request by the government of Kuwait
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter-the inherent right of self-defense, we do not
require any additional authority."). Paul Lewis, U.S. Preparing U.N. Draft on Claims
Against Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1990, at A12; Thomas L. Friedman, Moscow
Refuses to Rule Out Force, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1990, at A13 (citing Secretary of State
Baker); Neil A. Lewis, Sorting Out Legal War Concerning Real War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
1990, at A18. Britain took the same view. See Thatcher Says West Has Authority for Action
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defense theory a blow when he said that, given three months of Security
Council activity on the Persian Gulf situation, states could not rely on
Article 51.214 Several U.S. allies said they would not countenance mili-
tary action against Iraq without a Security Council resolution. 21 5 At
about that time, the administration shifted to a strategy of securing a
Security Council resolution calling for force against Iraq and stopped
pushing the collective self-defense theory.2 16 After November 29, 1990,
the administration did not formally renounce the collective self-defense
theory, 2 17 but did not reiterate it. Instead, it took the view that Resolu-
tion 678 provided a legal basis for its military action against Iraq.218
The collective self-defense theory was weak because Article 51 does
not give the Security Council the right to take military action. Article 51,
rather, contemplates action by an individual state to defend itself, or by
a group of states or by regional security systems to defend a state that
has been attacked. 2 19 Far from giving a right of action to the Security
Council, Article 51 preserves a right of action to entities other than the
Security Council, by way of exception to the other Articles of Chapter
VII. This right of individual or collective action was preserved on the
ground that a state should be permitted to act immediately if attacked,
and to seek aid from other states. If the Security Council were unable to
take action because of a veto, the state attacked, or others at its request,
should be permitted to act. 220 Article 51 was inserted as the last Article
Against Iraq, REUTERS BC CYCLE, Oct. 30, 1990; Colin Warbrick, The Invasion of Kuwait
by Iraq, 40 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 482, 487 (1991).
214. U.N. Article 51 May Not Permit Strike at Iraq, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1990, at A30.
215. See Thomas L. Friedman, Allies Tell Baker Use of Force Needs U.N. Backing, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, at A14 (listing Turkey, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
China).
216. Thomas L. Friedman, Moscow Refuses to Rule Out Force, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
1990, at A13 (stating that at the start of a recent trip abroad, Secretary Baker
declared a right under Article 51 to attack Iraq but that after talks with Bahrain,
Egypt, China, and Saudi Arabia, he stressed the need to work through the Security
Council); Abram Chayes, Bush Will Lose the Legal High Ground if He Attempts to Expand
theAims of the Gulf War, L.A. DAILYJ., Feb. 26, 1991, at 6 (stating that the administra-
tion abandoned the collective self-defense claim "and began the serious diplomatic
process that led to [res. 678]").
217. See DavidJ. Scheffer, Bush Wins the Right to Look for Trouble, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
30, 1990, at B7 ("The White House has not abandoned its longstanding position that
regardless of Security Council decisions, the United States can act at any time (even
before Jan. 15) to liberate Kuwait on grounds of collective self-defense.").
218. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
219. There was some opinion that Article 51 did not permit action by other states
to assist a state under attack, absent a pre-existing security arrangement by treaty.
See, e.g., KELSEN, supra note 195, at 792. The prevailing view, however, is to the con-
trary, and the Security Council has never used this theory. GOODRICH ET AL., supra
note 98, at 348; Weston, supra note 44, at 520; Schachter, supra note 95, at 1639.
Whatever its meaning, "collective self-defense," as others have noted, is a misnomer,
since a state coming to the aid of another state is not defending itself. In domestic
criminal and tort law, the terminology is neater, with defense of one's own person
being termed "self-defense," and defense of someone else being termed "defense of
another." WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 454, 463 (1986).
220. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 98, at 345.
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of Chapter VII, and is an exception to what otherwise would have been
the Security Council's monopoly on the lawful use of force. Nothing in
the drafting history of Article 51 suggests that it authorizes action by the
Security Council. 22 1
The related argument was that Article 51 provided an independent
legal basis for the military action against Iraq, apart from Resolution
678. Schachter stated that Resolution 678 was legally unnecessary to
the military action against Iraq, but that it "served the political purpose
of underlining the general support of the United Nations for the military
measures." 22 2 In support of this approach, Schachter cited Security
Council Resolution 661, which, in a preambular paragraph,
"[a]ffirm[ed] the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense,
in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance
with Article 51 of the Charter." 22 3 Schachter said that this language
"supported the contention that it would be legitimate for the third states
to use force, if necessary, against Iraq to compel its withdrawal. '224
Schachter further argued that the Security Council did not deem its
action regarding Iraq to supersede action against Iraq by individual
states. "[T]he resolutions contained no indication that self-defense
rights were meant to be terminated by the adoption of sanctions.
Indeed, the very resolution, No. 661, that first adopted the economic
sanctions included the preambular paragraph . . . affirming rights of
individual and collective self-defense." 22 5 Thus, Schachter suggested
that the Security Council believed that individual state action could go in
tandem with Security Council enforcement action.
The Security Council made no such implication, however, in Reso-
lution 661. It would be strange indeed for the Council to authorize mili-
tary action in an ambiguous preambular phrase. Although it is unclear
why the Council included this language, the Council may have meant to
say, as Schachter also indicates, that states might lawfully undertake a
blockade to enforce the trade embargo called for in Resolution 661.
The resolution called for a trade embargo but did not establish a block-
ade, and some states, particularly the United States, were anxious to
enforce it by means of a blockade.2 26 If the preamble did contemplate
preserving a collective self-defense right for a blockade, then, arguably,
it might have done the same for a military attack as well. There is no
basis, however, for concluding that this preambular language contem-
plated possible military action by states to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. At
the Security Council meeting at which Resolution 661 was adopted,
there was no discussion suggesting the propriety of military action by
221. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 172, at 297-308.
222. Schachter, supra note 92, at 460. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
took this view as well. Warbrick, supra note 213, at 487.
223. S.C. Res. 661, supra note 6, preambular para. 6.
224. Schachter, supra note 92, at 458.
225. Id.
226. The Council authorized states to enforce the embargo with a blockade three
weeks later. S.C. Res. 665, supra note 9.
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the Council, or by Member States, to force Iraq from Kuwait.227
The major obstacle to using Article 51 to justify the action against
Iraq was that Article 51 permits force by individual states only "until the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security."'228 ByJanuary 16, 1991, the Security Coun-
cil had adopted a series of resolutions to deal with Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait. 229 The matter is not free of ambiguity, however, because Arti-
cle 51 does not specify when it should be deemed that the Council has
taken "the measures necessary."
Schachter interpreted Article 51 to mean that when the Council
acts, individual states may act as well, until such time as the Council
adopts a resolution telling them to stop. He pointed out that the Coun-
cil never told the United States or other states to stop.230 This approach
is not workable. Since Council decisions are subject to the veto, states
could do whatever they liked, if one member of the Council declined to
stop them.
Schachter wrote that if the Article 51 exception is taken literally, it
would override self-defense and collective self-defense whenever the
Council adopted any resolution on a breach of the peace situation, such
as a resolution calling on an invader to withdraw. 23 1 Schachter con-
tends that this would be an absurd interpretation of Article 51,232 and
such would seem to be the case. A resolution calling for withdrawal is
not a "measure" within the meaning of Article 51, since it calls for no
Security Council action.
At the other extreme, one might argue that not only must the Coun-
cil have acted but must have achieved its aim as well, namely by stopping
the unlawful action. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher took this
position after Iraq invaded Kuwait, saying that the Council would have
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and secur-
ity only when it succeeded in expelling Iraq from Kuwait. 233 This view,
however, would deprive the Security Council of any meaningful role,
because it would let states operate independently of the Council even as
the Council acted. The Charter clearly gives the Council the right to
assume control of a situation and to direct all action aimed at con-
fronting the aggression.
The Thatcher view would deprive the Security Council of its Char-
227. Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. S1
PV.2933 (1990). Britain stated at the meeting that the "economic sanctions should
not be regarded as a prelude to anything else. Here I obviously refer to military
action." Id. at 27 (statement of Sir Crispin Tickell, U.K.); Paul Lewis, Security Council
Votes 13 to 0 to Block Trade with Baghdad, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 7, 1990, at Al.
228. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
229. See supra notes 5-10.
230. Schachter, supra note 92, at 458-59.
231. Id. at 458.
232. Id.
233. Warbrick, supra note 213, at 487.
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ter role of primary responsibility to deal with breaches of the peace.2 34
If any and all states could lawfully strike out on their own, even after the
Council had taken measures, the Council's role would be marginalized.
Referring to the Council's "primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security," Abram Chayes said that
[t]o carry out that responsibility, the council must have the authority to
make the political judgments and to take the measures necessary to deal
with the situation. This conception of the Security Council's role rein-
forces the fundamental aim of the charter to limit unilateral use of force
to the narrowest possible range. 23 5
The correct approach must lie somewhere between the two extreme
positions. It would appear that the Council takes measures in the sense
of Article 51 when it commences concrete action to address a breach of
peace. The imposition of economic sanctions under Article 41 consti-
tutes such action. Consequently, from August 6, 1990, the date of the
trade embargo,23 6 individual states were precluded from taking
independent military action to defend Kuwait.
Another obstacle to a collective self-defense justification for the
action against Iraq is that the action would have to have been "neces-
sary" to secure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, since force may be used
in defense only if necessary to thwart aggression.23 7 Elsewhere,
Schachter asserted, and he would seem to be on solid ground, that
where one state has unlawfully taken the territory of another, peaceful
settlement must be attempted before force is used to recover the terri-
tory.23 8 Thus, it would have to appear that the Security Council's sanc-
tions and other possible avenues for peaceful settlement had been
exhausted.
Recognizing this obstacle, Schachter argued that, by adopting Reso-
lution 678, the Security Council made an "authoritative determination"
of the necessity of the use of military force against Iraq.2 39 That propo-
sition might be true if the Council had called for immediate military
force against Iraq, but instead it called for force only after January 15,
1991, and, as Schachter elsewhere acknowledged, it was impossible as of
November 29, 1990, to know whether there would be a necessity to use
force six weeks hence.240 The Council in Resolution 678 made no find-
ing that measures short of military force would not succeed, and logi-
cally could not because it could not know what the situation would be on
234. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1 (U.N. members "confer on the Security Council
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security...").
235. Abram Chayes, Gulf War Isn't Possible Without the U.N.; The Charter Precludes Uni-
lateral Military Action, L.A. TiMES, Nov. 9, 1990, at B7. See also O'Connell, supra note
90, at 477 ("If some states act unilaterally, including the defended state, the Coun-
cil's efforts could be undermined.").
236. S.C. Res. 661, supra note 6.
237. See Schachter, supra note 95, at 1635-37; Weston, supra note 44, at 520-21.
238. Schachter, supra note 95, at 1637 (citing the Malvinas-Falkland case).
239. Schachter, supra note 92, at 460.
240. Id. at 456.
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To support the view that the military action against Iraq could be
lawful as Article 51 collective self-defense, apart from any Security
Council resolution, Rostow relied on Korea as a precedent. Rostow said
that although some considered the Security Council's action in Korea an
enforcement action, it in fact involved only "national forces carrying out
a mission of collective self-defense under American direction, not a
Security Council enforcement action." 242
If the military action in Korea was collective self-defense, the Secur-
ity Council was apparently not aware of it at the time, because it adopted
resolutions calling for military action under a U.N. command.243
Although, as with the action against Iraq, the Security Council did not
clearly define the basis under the Charter during the hostilities in Korea,
the Council did not purport to act in collective self-defense.
Thus, the collective self-defense theory provides no legal basis for
Resolution 678, because Article 51 gave the Security Council no powers.
Nor does the theory justify the military action against Iraq apart from
Resolution 678, because the Security Council had taken measures to
deal with the situation.
VI. Sanctions or Fig Leaf?
During the Security Council discussion of Resolution 678, Iraq com-
plained that "the United States totally dominates the Security Council
and its arbitrary and biased procedures." 2 44 It said that the United
States proposed Resolution 678 "as a cover for its aggressive and impe-
rialist policies in the region."' 245 The resolution was drafted by and lob-
bied for by the United States, which sought its passage only after
assembling an invasion force in Saudi Arabia in early November without
consulting the Security Council. 246 These circumstances suggest that
the Bush administration first prepared to invade Iraq and then sought
the Council's approval. 247
The deployment of the invasion force implied a decision to use
force.248 In a Senate hearing in early December 1990, Senator Paul
Sarbanes said that the troop buildup "almost takes you irresistibly down
241. See supra text accompanying note 127.
242. Rostow, supra note 92, at 508.
243. S.C. Res. 84, supra note 151.
244. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 23 (statement of Mr. AI-Anbari,
Iraq).
245. Id.
246. See Gordon, supra note 11.
247. See Rostow, supra note 92, at 522 (acknowledging that the U.S. went to the
Security Council only after "it had already begun unilaterally to amass an 'offensive'
force of an ultimate half-million military personnel").
248. MARTIN YANT, DESERT MIRAGE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE GULF WAR 106
(1991) ("[Slince U.S. troops couldn't remain in the harsh Saudi desert indefinitely,
Bush's 'offensive option' was actually an offensive imperative.").
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the path of going to war."'24 9 Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former national
security advisor, said that "the enormous deployment of American
forces, coupled with talk of no compromise," meant that the United
States was "pointed toward a war with Iraq."12 50 Senator Nancy Kas-
sebaum pointed out that mobilization of the invasion force in early
November created the need to invade Iraq soon. Senator Kassebaum
stated:
I do not know if there has been any real exploration of exactly how we will
prolong sanctions as well as maintain our large force in the region. Do we
start rotations? Do we downsize our force? Those who have asked to
extend the time period to let economic sanctions work have to realize that
there are significant dislocations that are occurring with the callup of the
reservists. 25 1
The administration put what became Resolution 678 onto the table
only after gaining assurances of support from the other permanent
members, 252 because it did not want to risk the veto of a resolution for
an attack it had already, for all practical purposes, decided to launch. To
secure the passage of Resolution 678 by the Security Council, the Bush
administration pulled out all the diplomatic stops. It pursued the vote
of the USSR by declining to press it over self-determination of the Baltic
states. The administration convinced Saudi Arabia to give aid to the
USSR, as a further inducement to vote for the resolution, even though it
was not contemplated that the USSR would contribute troops.2 53 The
administration courted China by keeping silent on the persecution of
political dissidents there.2 54 It wooed Third World members of the
Security Council by promising financial aid.25 5 After Yemen voted
against the resolution, the administration cut off its economic aid.2 5 6
249. U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, supra note 34, at 130 (statement of Sen.
Sarbanes).
250. Id. at 165 (statement of Zbigniew Brzezinski).
251. Id. at 126-27 (statement of Sen. Kassebaum).
252. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 333-35 (describing efforts of administration,
prior to submitting the draft resolution, to gain support of permanent members).
253. See Thomas L. Friedman, How U.S. Won Support to Use Mideast Forces, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1990, at Al; World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 29,
1990) (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File); Nightline, U.N. Passes Resolution Authorizing
Use of Force (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 29, 1990) (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curmt
File).
254. See Weston, supra note 44, at 523-24; U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, supra note
34, at 171 (statement of Zbigniew Brzezinski that "we may be buying support for our
military undertaking by sacrificing... the Baltic peoples for Gorbachev's [coopera-
tion], the Chinese dissidents for Li Peng's"). See also W. Michael Reisman, Some Les-
sons from Iraq: International Law and Democratic Politics, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 203, 208-09
(1991) (arguing that these compromises were justified, in the interest of opposing
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait); World News Tonight, supra note 253; Nightline, supra note
253.
255. World News Tonight, supra note 253.
256. See Kirgis, supra note 19 1, at 141;Judith Miller, Kuwaiti Envoy Says Baker Vowed
"No Concessions" to Iraqis, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 5, 1990, at A22 (Kuwaiti ambassador to
U.S. quoted as saying that Secretary Baker told him U.S. would cut aid to Yemen
because of its vote on Resolution 678). Rick Atkinson & Barton Gellman, Iraq Trying
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Although the Bush administration portrayed the resolution as the start
of a new age of collective international action to oppose aggression, the
administration, more than the Council, was orchestrating the action
against Iraq.2 57
The Bush administration's record of commitment to working
through the Security Council was already checkered when Iraq invaded
Kuwait. A year earlier, the administration intervened militarily to stop a
coup in the Philippines, without consulting the Security Council.2 58 It
invaded Panama without consulting either the United Nations or the
Organization of American States, and when that invasion was con-
demned by both the O.A.S.2 59 and the U.N., 260 the administration
barely took notice.2 61
Closer to the Persian Gulf, the United States had done little to end
Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, or the West
Bank of the Jordan River, despite repeated calls by the Security Council
and General Assembly, 26 2 and despite the United States' preponderant
role in providing financial aid to Israel. Even as the Persian Gulf crisis
unfolded, the Bush administration thwarted efforts by other states to
convoke a conference that might resolve the Palestinian-Israeli con-
flict. 263 A former U.N. official wrote that "ordinary Arabs" were
''acutely aware that the United States has never allowed decisive U.N.
action on behalf of the Palestinian Arabs" and that they therefore
viewed military action against Iraq as motivated by the self-interest of
the allied states. 26 4
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WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1989, at A17 (General Assembly condemnation of Panama
invasion).
261. The ease with which the administration ignored international sentiment on
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The Security Council condemned Israel for its 1982 invasion of
Lebanon, during which 20,000 Lebanese were killed, and which resulted
in Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.2 65 Yet no international coa-
lition was formed to reverse this aggression and occupation; the Bush
administration had taken no initiatives on the matter. In 1974 Turkey
invaded Cyprus and occupied a section of it, and the Security Council
called on Turkey to withdraw,26 6 but in 1990 Turkey was still in occupa-
tion, and neither the United Nations nor the United States had taken
serious action aimed at forcing it OUt.2 6 7
If a new world order was emerging, it was a selective order, and
states objecting to Resolution 678 were quick to point out the selectivity.
Iraq told the Security Council "that small States that do not enjoy veto
power in the Security Council and find no one to protect them from the
superpower permanent members are the only countries exposed to
sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. '2 68 It alluded to "the fact
that the United States is the Power that, over many years, forestalled
international unanimity and prevented the imposition of sanctions on
the Zionist entity [Israel] for its expansionist and aggressive poli-
cies." 2 69 Cuba referred to "the contrast between the attitude of the
Council towards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and, to mention just two
examples, towards the United States invasion of Panama not long ago
and the situation in Palestine and the Arab territories, under occupation
for 23 years now." 270 Even if the military action against Iraq had been
carried out in accord with Charter procedures, one might have consid-
ered it an exception, rather than the start of a new era in international
cooperation. But the disregard of Charter procedures in the Iraq action
meant that it was simply another unilateral action by the United States,
albeit with some international cover.
VII. Consequences
States bear international liability for their unlawful uses of force, as do
the individual officials responsible.2 7 1 In the Persian Gulf War, several
states and their officials are potentially liable. Iraq's aggression against
Kuwait and its destructive acts during the occupation open it and its
265. S.C. Res. 509, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., 2374th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/38
(1982) (demanding that Israel withdraw from Lebanon).
266. S.C. Res. 353, U.N. SCOR, 29th Sess., 1781st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/30
(1974) (demanding an end to foreign military intervention in Cyprus).
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See, e.g., Linda Feldmann, Efforts to Reunite Cyprus Heighten with New U.S. Push, CHRIS-
TIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 23, 1991, at 8; Andrew Rosenthal, U.S. Again Threatens
Force to Stop Iraqi Atom Program, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1991, at A4 (U.S. gains agreement
of Greece and Turkey to confer over Cyprus issue).
268. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 13, at 23 (statement of Mr. A-Anbari,
Iraq).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 56 (statement of Mr. Malmierca Peoli, Cuba).
271. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILrr: PART I (1983); 1 INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 137-40 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. 1986).
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officials to liability. 2 72 The states that attacked Iraq after its invasion of
Kuwait also used force unlawfully, although their situation differs from
Iraq's in that their use of force was at least putatively defensive. The
illegality in their actions is not that they used force when none was war-
ranted, but that they usurped international procedures by refusing to
respect the Charter role of the Security Council. The illegality of their
actions is thus of a different type than Iraq's.
Under the Charter, no distinction is made, however, between
unprovoked aggression and unlawful force putatively, but improperly,
used in defense. One might draw analogies from the domestic law of
some jurisdictions on self-defense, where a special intermediate cate-
gory is created for responsive force that fails to satisfy the requirements
of lawful defense.2 7"
To clarify responsibility for the military action in the Persian Gulf,
an opinion by the International Court of Justice would be helpful. As
was seen in Nicaragua's case against the United States, the Court has the
power to make determinations about the legality of military action.2 74
Iraq and the United States could not sue each other in the Court, how-
ever, because neither is currently subject to the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction, and no treaty confers jurisdiction on this issue.2 75
The Court may also issue advisory opinions, at the request of the
Security Council or General Assembly.2 76 Since Resolution 678 was a
U.N. action, either the Council or the Assembly could ask the Court for
an advisory opinion. Such an opinion would not be binding, but it
would provide guidance for the future on the scope of the Council's
power. This guidance might help avert future abuses of the Council's
powers.
The U.N. Charter scheme regarding the use of military force is
aimed at minimizing force. One method of minimizing force is to organ-
ize against aggression. However, aggression must be met with the least
possible counter-force. In the Persian Gulf situation, the United States
and its allies used force that was not clearly necessary and thereby failed
to abide by the basic norms of the Charter. The United States and its
allies exceeded Resolution 678, and the resolution itself did not provide
a lawful basis for action.
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The United Nations also bears responsibility for authorizing force
in violation of the Charter. The United Nations is a legal entity capable
of bearing legal rights277 and obligations. 278 It is responsible for the
wrongs it commits and its powers are only those indicated in the Char-
ter. If the United Nations acts to the detriment of a state, outside the
powers conferred in the Charter, it violates the rights of that state.279
If the United Nations is liable, all of its Member States may be liable
as well. There is little solid law on Member State liability in interna-
tional organizations, and the U.N. Charter is silent on the matter.280
There is, however, no general rule of customary international law
shielding Member States from liability for the acts of an international
organization. 28' In any event, the funds for payment of compensation
would come from Member States, who are the only source of income for
the United Nations.28 2
Persons who plan or wage aggressive war are individually responsi-
ble for crimes against peace.283 Since the action against Iraq was not in
lawful defense, the civilian and military leaders of the United States may
be guilty of planning and waging aggressive war against Iraq.28 4 Lead-
ers of the allied states are responsible either directly or on the basis of
complicity or conspiracy.2 85 Several of these leaders may also be indi-
vidually responsible for the bombing of civilians in Iraqi cities. Fact-
277. Id. art. 104 ("The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Mem-
bers such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the
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finding would need to be undertaken to determine the role of a particu-
lar leader, but, as indicated, the bombing exceeded the limits set by
humanitarian law. 28 6
While it is important to hold malefactors to account, it is also
important to hold to account those who act against them. In domestic
law, the commission of a crime does not give authorities the right to take
any and all action against a perpetrator. That action is circumscribed by
rules necessary to prevent over-reaching. Similarly, under the U.N.
Charter, the organization is restricted by norms designed to ensure
against overreaching. Thus, while it is important to hold Iraq responsi-
ble for its aggression, it is also important to respond to violations of the
law committed in the course of responding to aggression.
Conclusion
The actions of the United States and allied states against Iraq in
1991 were taken on the basis of Security Council Resolution 678, which
exceeded the Council's powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.
Invoking Resolution 678, the United States initiated military activity
without a showing of need, employed excessive force against Iraq, and
then continued military activity after Iraq indicated a readiness to leave
Kuwait, and even after it began to withdraw. Thus, there was illegality
both at the stage of authorization and at the stage of execution.
At a point in history when the superpowers have buried the hatchet,
it is unfortunate that the United Nations did not follow Charter proce-
dure during Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It was vital that the Security
Council oppose Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. The Council's eco-
nomic sanctions were an appropriate measure.2 8 7 When the Council
took the next step, authorizing military action, it did not have the affirm-
ative votes of all five permanent members, and the Council did not find
the economic sanctions to have failed before giving Member States an
ill-defined authorization to take military action. Finally, it established no
Council control over the action. The Security Council, led by the
United States, provided a cover for unilateral military action.
The military action against Iraq did, to be sure, result in Iraq's
departure from Kuwait, and thus ended an illegal occupation. To that
extent the action served a purpose consonant with the precepts of the
Charter. However, this was accomplished at a high cost in human suffer-
ing that was not demonstrably necessary. Had the Council followed
Charter procedure, it could have avoided these consequences. The
experience of the Council's action in the Persian Gulf situation should
warn world leaders in future crises. The establishment of a collective
security system does not ensure that the arrangement will be used as
286. See supra text accompanying notes 102-09.
287. See Ved P. Nanda, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: The U.N. Response, 15 S. ILL. U.
LJ. 431, 435 (1991).
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intended. The U.N. Charter provides no guarantee against the abuse of
Charter processes.

